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Introduction
How can regulation keep up with transactions? The contemporary
world economy facilitates international production and trade. In turn, par-
titioning transactions into separate geographical components allows par-
ties to pick and choose regulatory regimes. Antitrust law has dealt with
this problem for nearly a century. At one time, antitrust law regarded the
assignment of a transaction to a particular territory as a prerequisite for the
application of a jurisdiction's rules; lately it has required much less. As a
result, overlapping national regulation has become the dominant structure
regulating cross-border transactions.
Overlapping regulation has its own problems. Different national
regimes may impose inconsistent rules and pursue conflicting ends. In
response, regulators and scholars have begun to explore the possibility of
international governance. The proposals vary, but at their heart lies a con-
viction that the inadequacies of national regulation justify the creation of
international institutions to promote the coordination of national regula-
tory programs.'
1. Concrete steps by regulators include the formation of the International Competi-
tion Network ("ICN"), an initiative of the U.S. Department of Justice, International Com-
petition Network, ICN Billboard, http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org (last
visited Sept. 29, 2004) [hereinafter ICN Billboard], and the decision to include antitrust
policy as a topic for the Doha Round of trade negotiations held under World Trade
Organization (WTO) auspices, Ministerial Declaration, Nov. 14, 2001, 41 I.L.M. 746, [
23-25 at 750 (2002) [hereinafter Ministerial Declaration], available at http://
www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/minist-e/min0le/mindecl-e.pdf. For scholarly pro-
posals to extend international harmonization in antitrust law, see generally Eleanor M.
Fox, International Antitrust and the Doha Dome, 43 VA.J. INT'L L. 911 (2003) [hereinafter
Fox, Doha Dome] and Andrew T. Guzman, International Antitrust and the WTO-The
Lesson from Intellectual Property, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 933 (2003) [hereinafter Guzman, Les-
son]. Other recent scholarship attests to renewed interest in the issue of international
cooperation and antitrust. For a representative sample, see generally Eleanor M. Fox,
Antitrust and Regulatory Federalism- Races Up, Down, and Sideways, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv.
1781 (2000) [hereinafter Fox, Races] (arguing for multinational solutions to competition
law issues, such as a common clearinghouse for multinational merger filings, mutual
recognition of merger filings, and rules for choice of law in merger and market access
cases); Ignacio Garcia Bercero & Stefan D. Amarasinha, Moving the Trade and Competi-
tion Debate Forward, 4 J. INT'L ECON. L. 481 (2001) (arguing that anticompetitive prac-
tices that take place on a multinational scale require a multilateral response); Eleanor M.
Fox, Mergers in Global Markets: GE/Honeywell and the Future of Merger Control, 23 U.
PA. J. Irrr'L EcoN. L. 457 (2002) [hereinafter Fox, Mergers]; Andrew T. Guzman, Is Inter-
national Antitrust Possible?, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1501 (1998) [hereinafter Guzman, Interna-
tional Antitrust] (arguing that international cooperation in antitrust would create gains);
Antonio F. Perez, International Antitrust at the Crossroads: The End of Antitrust History or
the Clash of Competition Policy Civilizations?, 33 LAw & Pol'Y INT'L Bus. 527 (2002) (ana-
lyzing the role of American antitrust law in the creation of international antitrust law);
Edward T. Swaine, Against Principled Antitrust, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 959 (2003) (arguing in
favor of a pragmatic, as opposed to principled, approach to internationalizing antitrust
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I argue, in opposition to most commentators, that dispensing with
international institutions is the most promising approach to the problem.
Creating new international institutions to grapple with antitrust or
assigning this task to existing organizations presents underappreciated
risks, and the status quo of international near-anarchy has underap-
preciated benefits. The growing call by regulators and scholars to widen
and deepen international cooperation in competition policy should be
resisted. Judge Wood, a leading authority on international antitrust,
recently wrote that "[hiarmonization is something to which only a cur-
mudgeon would take exception. ' 2 I rise to that challenge.3
My argument against international cooperation has both negative and
affirmative elements. On the negative side, the calls for international
imposition of either substantive rules of antitrust law or the assignments of
regulatory jurisdiction rest more on hope than on evidence. There are
good reasons to believe that either form of cooperation will produce unde-
sirable outcomes. In particular, government failure at the national level
may replicate itself at the international level, yet international regimes are
more difficult to unwind than is domestic regulation.
On the affirmative side, I identify forces shaping international eco-
nomic relations among the world's most prosperous and powerful states
that can punish those nations whose antitrust laws produce substantial
losses in global welfare and reward those that adopt policies that enhance
global welfare. In an information-based economy with substantial interna-
law); Alan 0. Sykes, Externalities in Open Economy Antitrust and Their Implications for
International Competition Policy, 23 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 89 (1999) (explaining ties
between competition laws and trade policy); Daniel K. Tarullo, Norms and Institutions in
Global Competition Policy, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 478 (2000) (discussing the formation and
enforcement of international antitrust policy); Michael J. Trebilcock, Competition Policy
and Trade Policy, 31J. WORLD TRADE 71 (1997) (arguing that member states of the WTO
should agree to a system of competition law that eliminates protectionism); Spencer
Weber Waller, An International Common Law of Antitrust, 34 NEw ENG. L. REV. 163
(1999) (proposing that the WTO encourage cooperation in competition law without
creating a "full international antitrust code"); Russell J. Weintraub, Competing Competi-
tion Laws: Do We Need a Global Standard?, 34 NEW ENG. L. REv. 27 (1999) (arguing that
nations should share information with the antitrust enforcement authorities of other
nations); Diane P. Wood, International Harmonization of Antitrust Law: The Tortoise or
the Hare?, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 391 (2002) (proposing a gradual and cautious approach to
harmonizing competition law on an international scale). For skepticism, see John 0.
McGinnis, The Political Economy of International Antitrust Harmonization, 45 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 549 (2003) (opposing substantive harmonization of competition law on
the grounds that it would create high agency costs, would discourage beneficial change,
and would not suit the needs of all countries bound by it). For a recent collection of
diverse points of view, see COMPETITION LAWS IN CONFLICT: ANTITRUST JURISDICTION IN THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds., 2004).
2. Wood, supra note 1, at 391.
3. Cf. Paul B. Stephan, The Skeptic Speaks: I Am Not a Blind, Pig-Stupid Opponent of
Unification, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 96TH ASIL ANNUAL MEETING 336 (2002) (opposing
unification and emphasizing the drawbacks of capture and "lock-in"). See generally Paul
B. Stephan, The Futility of Unification and Harmonization in International Commercial
Law, 39 VA. J. Irrr'L L. 743 (1999) (focusing on the process of international lawmaking
as opposed to the substance of the laws and advocating national experimentation and
regulatory competition).
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tional mobility of financial and human capital, and significant interna-
tional trade, states that impose an antitrust system that protects domestic
producers from welfare-enhancing competition should experience lower
levels of investment and innovation. Countries that use competition law to
punish more efficient foreign producers will suffer losses in consumer wel-
fare without obtaining any offsetting competitive gains, once innovation
losses are taken into account. Countries that use competition law to pun-
ish foreign producers that engage in inefficient forms of industrial organi-
zation, on the other hand, should experience some economic benefits.
This argument fits into a larger project.4 Since the end of the Cold
War, the pull towards greater international cooperation in economic regu-
lation has seemed irresistible. The growing prominence of existing institu-
tions, especially the World Trade Organization ("WTO"), the International
Monetary Fund ("IMF"), the World Bank, the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development ("OECD"), and the organs of the European
Union ("EU") and of the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA")
is met with calls for the creation of new regimes with additional regulatory
powers. Much of the criticism of these developments reflects either a deep
suspicion of the culture and values of late-stage capitalism and global mar-
kets5 or an atavistic celebration of national sovereignty. 6 My critique is
different. One does not have to reject markets and competition as virtuous
means to advance human liberty and dignity, nor privilege the nation-state
as a paragon of democratic governance, to resist the kinds of international
cooperation that seem to loom in the world economy's future. I argue that
4. See generally Paul B. Stephan, Regulatory Cooperation and Competition-The
Search for Virtue in Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation, in LEGAL PROBLEMS AND POLITI-
CAL PROSPECTS 167 (George A. Bermann et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter Stephan, Virtue]
(describing and extolling regulatory competition); Paul B. Stephan, Accountability and
International Lawmaking: Rules, Rents, and Legitimacy, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 681
(1996-1997) [hereinafter Stephan, Accountability] (discussing political economy of
international lawmaking); Paul B. Stephan, Courts, Tribunals, and Legal Unification-The
Agency Problem, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 333 (2002) [hereinafter Stephan, Courts] (applying
evolutionary game theory); Paul B. Stephan, Institutions and Elites: Property, Contract, the
State, and Rights in Information in the Global Economy, 10 CARDozo J. Ir'rrL & COMP. L.
801 (2002) (arguing that improving rules governing the allocation of jurisdiction is pref-
erable to unifying the substantive law governing rights in information); Paul B. Stephan,
The Political Economy of Choice of Law, 90 GEo. L.J. 957 (2002) [hereinafter Stephan,
Choice of Law] (exploring drawbacks of international legal unification); Paul B. Stephan,
International Governance and American Democracy, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 237 (2000) (identi-
fying a new kind of international law and arguing that it challenges American democ-
racy); Paul B. Stephan, Sheriff or Prisoner? The United States and the World Trade
Organization, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 49 (2000) [hereinafter Stephan, Sheriffl (questioning the
WTO approach to global economic matters); Paul B. Stephan, The New International
Law-Legitimacy, Accountability, Authority, and Freedom in the New Global Order, 70 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1555 (1999) (challenging the legitimacy and authority of new interna-
tional law).
5. See, e.g., RALPH NADER ET AL., THE CASE AGAINST "FREE TRADE": GATT, NAFTA,
AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF CORPORATE POWER (1993) (opposing globalization and free
trade on the grounds that they create inequality and further concentration of wealth).
6. See, e.g., PATRICKJ. BUCHANAN, THE GREAT BETRAYAL: HOW AMERICAN SOVEREIGNTY
AND SOCIAL JUSTICE ARE BEING SACRIFICED TO THE GODS OF THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (1998)
(arguing for protectionist measures on "patriotic" grounds).
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one can accept the inevitability of the complex of phenomena too easily
lumped together under the facile rubric of "globalization," worry about its
consequences for people around the world, understand the limitations of
nation-states in the face of these challenges, and still express skepticism
about the burgeoning growth of an international technocracy. Interna-
tional antitrust simply presents an opportunity to test this general
argument.
This paper proceeds in three parts. First, I provide a positive account
of the incentives countries face under conditions of international trade to
choose competition policies that do not maximize global welfare. This
account rests on a demonstration that competition policy and trade policy
are inseparable, and on a comparison of the potential welfare losses result-
ing from protection-motivated competition law to those resulting from con-
ventional tariff-based protection. I argue that the less transparent nature of
competition law makes its trade effects especially troubling. Second, I
review proposals to develop international regimes to either harmonize sub-
stantive competition law or allocate regulatory jurisdiction. I identify rea-
sons why such regimes are likely to be unsatisfactory. The same
considerations that lead countries to use competition law as a form of pro-
tection remain relevant in the context of international relations. Moreover,
an international regime will present additional problems of administration,
application, and adaptation. Third, I discuss the long-term incentives to
avoid the protection that nations face under conditions of factor mobility. I
review the empirical literature on trade and development and argue that a
similar positive correlation should exist between optimal choices of compe-
tition policy and economic growth. In the conclusion, I explore the limits
of my argument and suggest areas for future inquiry.
I. The Protean Nature of Competition Policy and Its Potential for
Abuse
Part of the problem of international antitrust is understanding the
relationship between competition policy and antitrust law. Most U.S. regu-
lators and some scholars seem to take for granted that the two subjects are
congruent.7 A consensus among them exists about the goals of competi-
tion policy-principally the maximization of consumer welfare-and the
general soundness of the means the United States uses to pursue those
goals. It seems easy enough to assume that the rest of the world under-
stands what we mean when we talk about competition and consumer wel-
fare, and not too hard to believe that any disagreements about optimal
7. See A. Douglas Melamed, Antitrust at the Turn of the Century, Speech at the
Fourth International Symposium on Competition Policy (Dec. 7, 1999), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov:80/atr/public/speeches/5232.pdf (speaking in the capacity of
Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the Department of Justice's Antitrust
Division and using the terms "antitrust law" and "competition law" interchangeably);
Andrew T. Guzman, Global Governance and the WTO, 45 Harv. Int'l LJ. 303, 318 n.62
(2004) [hereinafter Guzman, Global Governance) (same).
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competition policy stems from an incomplete understanding of the state of
the debate in the United States.
A moment's reflection, however, will suggest the difficulty in the prob-
lem of creating international competition law. From an international per-
spective, we do not have a common vocabulary or sense of the subject,
much less a common commitment to substantive ends.8 Once one appreci-
ates how undefined the concept of competition policy is, the difficulties of
coordinating national regulatory regimes become clearer.
First, I explain why competition policy has no logical boundaries and
instead bleeds into industrial policy and, more importantly, trade policy.
Second, I provide a theoretical argument supporting the prediction that
variance among nations will lead to significant differences in national com-
petition policies. In particular, I explain how conventional competition
policy techniques-merger regulation and attacks on producer collusion-
can function as trade barriers. Third, I provide evidence that important
states, on occasion, do use competition policy for protectionist ends. This
undermines the often unstated assumption that only insignificant barriers
stand in the way of a coordinated and institutionalized global antitrust
regime.
A. What Is Competition Policy?
Competition policy means many different things to its various practi-
tioners and students. At a formal level, its boundaries may seem clear. A
government invokes competition policy to regulate private actors who coor-
dinate their economic choices.9 U.S. antitrust law seems to be the princi-
pal and best example. But what of government decisions not to regulate
economic coordination? Is this weak competition policy or, behind a
facade of regulatory indifference, governmental direction of private eco-
nomic cooperation? Once one recognizes the difficulty of distinguishing
indifference from direction, it becomes impossible to cabin competition
policy so neatly.
The fundamental indeterminacy of the concept becomes even clearer
when one looks at its implementation in practice. Under the aegis of com-
petition policy, governments regulate producer choices, including deci-
sions to cooperate with other producers. Regulation of prices, of
marketing practices, and of the array of products offered all come within
its scope. Competition regulation involves decisions about competition,
but does not necessarily involve a preference for the consumer welfare cri-
terion as the benchmark of "competitive" markets. Supporting a national
champion, suppressing large-scale efficient producers that threaten politi-
cally influential small producers, and setting quotas on output all can con-
stitute "competition" policies, even though most economists would regard
8. See Wolfgang Pape, Socio-Cultural Differences and International Competition Law,
5 EUR. LJ. 438 (1999).
9. See Fox, Doha Dome, supra note 1, at 915.
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these strategies as presumptively inimical to consumer welfare.10
This seemingly obvious point is critical. Most regulators, practition-
ers, and scholars in the United States believe that competition policy
involves government intervention against anticompetitive behavior by pri-
vate actors. But competition cannot be an end to itself. Some kinds of
collusion can be unambiguously desirable, such as some provision of stan-
dardized goods or long-term supply contracts. As Oliver Williamson
famously observed decades ago, markets and organizational hierarchies
typically exist as alternatives, and there are no a priori reasons always to
prefer one over the other.1 1
One cannot have a competition policy, then, without some concept of
desirable cooperation. It follows that a state concerned about the level of
competition in a given market might either forbid or mandate particular
forms of cooperation. Competition policy thus fades into industrial policy.
They are conceptually the same, even if the two terms suggest different
regulatory methodologies, attitudes, and specialists.
Further, except in closed economies, competition and trade policy
overlap. Trade policy, at its heart, involves choices concerning the level of
competition between domestic and foreign producers that a state will per-
mit or encourage. This point seems obvious as a matter of logic, but, for
reasons I explore below, it becomes paramount with respect to industries
that have increasing returns to scale, the most important sectors of the
richest national economies. In many instances, competition and trade pol-
icies thus become two sides of the same coin.
Why does a conviction persist that competition policy constitutes an
autonomous discipline with its own technical expertise? 12 Competition
law appeared in the United States in response to private decisions to con-
solidate production. 13 Its principal manifestation was the Sherman Act,
which attacked cooperative actions "in restraint of trade" and abuses of
10. See Daniel J. Gifford & Robert T. Kudrle, Alternative National Merger Standards
and the Prospects for International Cooperation, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE LAw: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ROBERT E. HUDEC 208, 210-17 (Daniel L.M.
Kennedy & James D. Southwick eds., 2002); Michael Trebilcock & Robert Howse, Trade
Liberalization and Regulatory Diversity- Reconciling Competitive Markets with Competition
Politics, 6 EUR. J.L. & EcON. 5 (1998). National champions proliferate in the airlines and
in telecommunications industries. In the view of many, the protection of German and
Japanese shopkeepers from supermarket competition reflects a political bargain.
"Rationalization" of product markets through government-enforced production quotas is
characteristic of agriculture in Europe and the United States, the diamond industry, and
the ill-fated "New International Economic Order" of the 1970s. Declaration on the
Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3201, U.N. GAOR, 6th
Special Sess., Supp. No. 1, para. 4(e) at 3, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974).
11. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST
IMPLICATIONS 8 (1983).
12. See, e.g., William B. Burnett & William E. Kovacic, Reform of United States Acqui-
sition Policy: Competition, Teaming Agreements, and Dual-Sourcing, 6 YALEJ. ON REG. 249,
303 (1989) (discussing the technical expertise present in the Department of Justice and
the Federal Trade Commission).
13. Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1053
(1979).
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monopoly power. 14 Hokever, we should regard this congruence between
competition law and public regulation of private cooperation and consoli-
dation as a historical accident, not as the core of what constitutes competi-
tion policy.
.Even with its historical background, U.S. competition law never has
manifested an implacable hostility to all forms of industrial consolidation.
It accepts, for example, cooperation among producers organized or man-
dated by the several U.S. states.1 5 It also allows collusive political action to
bring about such state mandates. 16 The United States for almost a century
has promoted collusion among exporters. 17 More recently, it has sup-
ported similar cooperation among producers in supposedly strategic eco-
nomic sectors such as semiconductor design and production. 18 When one
turns to Europe or Japan, examples of competition policy coexisting with
and even reinforcing coordinated producer behavior abound.
The overlap between competition and trade policy leads to two impor-
tant complications. First, as I discuss below, a state may tailor its regula-
tory choices to its position in the world economy, favoring producers or
consumers depending on which actors predominate locally. Second, a
state may purport to pursue a uniform competition policy but, in practice,
apply different rules to foreign and domestic actors. In theory, trade law
forbids this. All developed countries have accepted an obligation of
"national treatment" or nondiscrimination between its own subjects and
others.19 The protean nature of competition policy, however, promotes
14. Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1994)). For a challenge to conventional accounts of U.S. competition policy as driven
by the pursuit of efficiency and consumer welfare, see THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES
OF ANTITRUST: THE PUBLIC CHOICE PERSPECTIVE (Fred S. McChesney & William F.
Shughart II eds., 1995); Fred S. McChesney, Talking 'Bout My Antitrust Generation: Com-
petition for and in the Field of Competition Law, 52 EMORY L.J. 1401 (2003).
15. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-52 (1942) (reasoning that the Congress
could have, but did not, intend for the Sherman Act to restrain state action); California
v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 100-05 (1989) (invoking the presumption against find-
ing federal preemption of state law in areas traditionally regulated by states); City of
Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., 499 U.S. 365, 370-73 (1991) (holding that where
municipalities put in place anticompetitive restraints to implement state policy, immu-
nity from Sherman Act liability extends to these municipalities).
16. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127,
135-42 (1961) (holding that efforts to influence the legislature to pass anticompetitive
laws were not within the scope of the Sherman Act); Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381
U.S. 657 (1965) (holding that union activity is not covered by the Sherman Act); Profl
Real Estate Investors v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49, 56-58 (1993) (holding
that litigation initiated with the intent to cause anticompetitive harm to a rival does not
constitute a violation of antitrust laws as long as the claims objectively have some merit).
17. Webb-Pomerene Act of 1918, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1994) (exempting U.S. busi-
ness associations from U.S. antitrust laws); Export Trading Company Act of 1982, 15
U.S.C. §§ 4001-21 (1994) (encouraging export trade associations and exempting them
from antitrust laws); Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C. § 6a
(1994) (exempting some foreign trade from U.S. antitrust laws).
18. National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 1984, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 4301-06 (1984).
19. See Michael J. Trebilcock & Edward M. lacobucci, National Treatment and Extra-
territoriality: Defining the Domains of Trade and Antitrust Policy, in COMPETITION LAws IN
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administrative discretion and facilitates discrimination disguised by a veil
of fact-specific, balancing-of-the-totality-of-circumstances analyses.
An obvious example of discriminatory competition law is the
antidumping regime that most developed countries employ, WTO stan-
dards restricting antidumping regulations notwithstanding. 20 Formally,
antidumping is part of trade law while predatory pricing is the subject of
antitrust. But functionally, these rules target the same behavior-success-
ful price competition that crowds out competitors. In most countries, how-
ever, foreign producers face more onerous restrictions. Under U.S.
antitrust law (which applies to domestic and foreign producers alike), pro-
hibited predation requires proof of below-cost sales in circumstances
where new entrants are unlikely to enter the market once the predator
raises prices. 2 1 Dumping, which applies only to imports, penalizes any
sale at a price below that used in the producer's home market, even if the
import price comprises a profit margin.22
Antidumping regimes present a specific instance of a more general
problem. Imagine Good A, the production of which has substantial econo-
mies of scale. Further, imagine that Good B is a substitute for Good A.
Suppose that the producers of Good B can influence decisions by the
authority that regulates the market where Goods A and B compete. If this
regulatory authority has the discretion to forbid levels of consolidation that
preclude the achievement of economies of scale, an enforcement action
brought against the producers of Good A will protect the Good B producers
from salutary competition. Moreover, if the competition authorities oper-
ate under a sufficiently discretionary mandate, they can take this action
without compromising their ability to tolerate comparable collusion by
producers of Good B. Nothing in the concept of "competition policy" pre-
cludes regulatory choices that decrease the overall level of competition in a
market or, much less, requires the level of competition that maximizes
welfare.
The broad definition of competition policy not only makes sense logi-
cally, but underscores the difficulties of achieving an international consen-
sus about its content. Even if states could agree that efficiency-
optimization of the sum of consumer and producer welfare-is the only
legitimate objective of competition policy, agreement as to whether a par-
ticular regime advances or detracts from efficiency would remain elusive.
CONFLICT, supra note 0, at 152 (arguing that the GATT national treatment principle suf-
fices to regulate international antitrust).
20. Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994, WTO Agreement, Dec. 15, 1993, Final Act Embodying the
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Annex IA, available at
http://www.wto.org/English/tratop-e/adpe/antidum2_e.htm [hereinafter GATT
Antidumping Agreement].
21. For the rules governing predatory pricing, see Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588-92 (1986).
22. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673, 1673b, 1673d (1994) (imposing antidumping duties on
foreign merchandise sold at below "fair" value); Council Regulation 384/96 of 22
December 1995 on Protection Against Dumped Imports from Countries Not Members
of the European Union, 1996 0.J. (L 56) 1(2).
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Specifying the optimal mix of competition and cooperation in a particular
economic sector is inevitably controversial. 23 Technological innovation
and other kinds of change, as well as shifting consumer preferences, limit
the lessons one can learn from a sector's history. Once legitimate differ-
ences over the optimal level of competition arise, it becomes difficult, if not
impossible, to determine whether a regulator is pursuing efficiency-driven
competition policy.
The proliferation of alternative objectives for competition policy multi-
plies the difficulty of finding common ground. Given the difficulty of fix-
ing optimal levels of competition, we should expect much competition law
to take the form of elastic standards rather than of precise and con-
straining rules. With increased discretion comes inconsistency. For exam-
ple, one cannot insist on maximizing consumer welfare and still promote
national champions or protect inefficient small producers. In turn, toler-
ance of inconsistency opens the door to discrimination. Regulatory
choices driven by animus towards foreign producers can be reconciled with
other, permissible rationales. The more open-ended and multi-factored the
policy and the greater the discretion of regulators to decide where and how
to apply competition policy, the easier it becomes to disguise trade protec-
tion as competition policy.24 Strategic deployment of competition law
would be most feasible where governments have exclusive enforcement
authority. 25
B. Competition Policy and Local Interests
Once one accepts that competition policy embraces great, and poten-
tially pernicious, flexibility, it becomes possible to speculate about what
ends a given state might choose to pursue. Modern trade theory offers
strong support for specific uses of competition rules to protect domestic
producers. Public choice theory provides a more general explanation for
why individual states would invoke competition policy for illiberal ends.
Both analyses predict that, absent an effective international regime to con-
strain their choices, national regulation of competition will generate global
welfare losses.
23. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Does Antitrust Have a Comparative Advantage?, 23
HA.v. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 5, 7 (1999) ("And here's the big point: [Bly and large, we can't
know when competition has 'failed."') (emphasis supplied).
24. See Guzman, Lesson, supra note 1, at 939; see also Swaine, supra note 1, at
966-74.
25. The United States is an outlier in terms of the extent to which actors other than
the national government have enforcement power. Even in the United States, however,
governmental enforcement decisions have a powerful effect on private suits, as evi-
denced by the preference of private plaintiffs to follow in the wake of Justice Department
litigation. See MARK R. JOELSON, AN INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST PRIMER: A GUIDE TO THE
OPERATION OF UNITED STATES, EUROPEAN UNION, AND OTHER KEY COMPETITION LAWS IN THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY 168-76 (2d ed. 2001).
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1. International Trade Theory
As a conceptual matter, three considerations can influence a state's
incentives to externalize the effects of its competition regulation. First, pro-
ducers in the sector in question may be over- or underrepresented in that
state as compared to the global distribution of that sector's producers. For
example, oil and natural gas production dominates a few national econo-
mies, while many important economies, such as the European Union and
Japan, produce virtually none of that good. Second, consumers of the
good in question similarly may be over- or underrepresented in the state.
Third, the global market for the good may be more or less competitive.
This last factor will affect the distribution between producers and consum-
ers of potential gains from industrial consolidation.
Consider first a good, the production of which has increasing returns
to scale up to the market clearing price. "Natural monopolies" and "net-
work goods" are general instances of this phenomenon. The good may
have declining marginal costs due to economies of scale, or the value cre-
ated by the good may increase with its consumption. In either case, the
most efficient producer is a monopolist.
2 6
Further, assume that consumption of this good is more or less evenly
distributed globally-if not per capita, then per dollar of gross domestic
product. Ignoring strategic issues and the possibility of coordination, a
state should prefer to be the home of this industry. The state can then
capture some portion of the producer's monopoly rents, while its consum-
ers will suffer no more than if any other state hosted the monopolist.
Under conditions of increasing returns to scale and international
trade, a rational competition policy would have the state protect the local
producer and inflict costs on the producers of all other states. Monopoly
does not produce global welfare losses (although some local consumers
and producers will be worse off than they would be if the state forbade the
monopoly), and it benefits the host state to the extent of producer surplus.
While some consumers in the host state might suffer, most of the lost con-
sumer surplus will be externalized to outsiders.
Strategic trade theory, as developed by Krugman and others in the late
1970s, addresses exactly these features of international trade. 2 7 It main-
tains that increasing returns to scale characterize production in many sec-
tors and that monopoly industrial organization thus constitutes the norm
rather than a deviation for large portions of the most developed econo-
26. See generally William J. Baumol & David F. Bradford, Optimal Departures from
Marginal Cost Pricing, 60 AM. EcON. REV. 265 (1970).
27. See generally AVINASH K. DIXIT & VICTOR NORMAN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE (F.H. Hahn ed., 1980); ELHANAN HELPMAN & PAUL R. KRUGMAN, MARKET STRUc-
TURE AND FOREIGN TRADE: INCREASING RETURNS, IMPERFECT COMPETITION, AND THE INTERNA-
TIONAL ECONOMY (1985); STRATEGIC TRADE POLICY AND THE NEw INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMICS (Paul R. Krugman ed., 1986); Paul R. Krugman, Increasing Returns, Monopo-
listic Competition, and International Trade, 9 J. INT'L ECON. 469 (1979); Kelvin Lancaster,
Intra-Industry Trade Under Perfect Monopolistic Competition, 10 J. INT'L ECON. 151
(1980).
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mies.28 The premises of liberal trade theory-that international trade pro-
ceeds in competitive markets and that comparative advantages in
production capacities determine the efficient distribution of production-
thus do not hold. Strategic trade theory argues that the distribution of
monopolist producers explains trade patterns better than the distribution
of producer endowments. 29 As a positive matter, it predicts that the higher
levels of international trade that result from lowered costs of transportation
and communication as well as reduced legal barriers will bring about
greater levels of industrial concentration. 30 As a normative matter, strate-
gic trade theory specifies the circumstances where states should prefer pro-
tection (broadly conceived to include subsidies to the local producers as
well as import barriers) to free trade.3 1 This justification for protection
goes strongly against the grain of liberal trade theory, which denies the
value of protection. 3 2
What does strategic trade theory suggest for countries that have no
hope of hosting an industry with increasing returns to scale? A country's
choices depend on its share of the global market for the good in question.
Those with small shares usually will not be able to prevent the foreign pro-
ducer from moving toward monopoly. If such a country tried to regulate
the producer, in response the producer could either raise prices in the local
market or refuse to import. Both outcomes would hurt consumers in the
regulating country and have no offsetting benefits.
A country with a sufficiently large share would have another option.
Such a country would have the capability to force the producer to internal-
ize the costs of its regulation. It rationally would block efficient growth by
the producer in instances where the benefits from consolidation, no matter
how large, would accrue to the producer and the increase in competition
would generate some benefits for local consumers, no matter how small.
Put simply, under specified conditions, which seem realistic if not abun-
dant, some countries will have both an incentive to restrict producers from
undertaking welfare-enhancing consolidation and cooperation, and the
capacity to implement that policy. These states will choose a competition
policy that, in terms of global efficiency, requires too much competition
and not enough hierarchy.3 3
28. HELPMAN & KRUGMAN, supra note 27, at 113-57.
29. Id. at 158-77.
30. M.J. TREBILCOCK ET AL., THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 10 (2d ed.
1999).
31. James A. Brandner, Rationales for Strategic Trade and Industrial Policy, in STRATE-
GIC TRADE POLICY AND THE NEw INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, supra note 27, at 23, 26-36.
32. For discussion of the tensions between strategic trade theory and liberal theory,
and a reconciliation based on political economy arguments, see Paul R. Krugman, Is Free
Trade Passe?, 1 J. EcON. PESP. 131, 143 (1987) ("It is possible, then, both to believe that
comparative advantage is an incomplete model of trade and to believe that free trade is
nevertheless the right policy.")
33. See Guzman, Lesson, supra note 1, at 942; Andrew T. Guzman, Choice of Law:
New Foundations, 90 GEO. L.J. 883, 906-09 (2002) [hereinafter Guzman, Choice of Law];
Guzman, International Antitrust, supra note 1, at 1512-15.
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The mirror argument also applies. Some states may host producers
that have diminishing returns to scale and export most of their production.
Examples would include industries that depend disproportionately on fac-
tor endowments, such as extraction or farming. These states might benefit
if their producers participated in a successful cartel. Monopoly rents
would stay at home, and the lion's share of the lost consumer surplus
would fall on consumers in the export markets. Under these conditions,
states would embrace a competition policy that not only tolerates, but
mandates, cartelization. In other words, these states would seek to effect a
competition policy that, in terms of global efficiency, requires too much
hierarchy and not enough competition. 34
These incentives become even more salient when states can evade the
national treatment obligation and discriminate against foreign producers.
In this case, regulators can apply one standard of acceptable collusion to
foreign producers, and another to domestic producers. For increasing-
returns-to-scale industries, a rational regulator would block collusion by
foreign producers, while encouraging local producers to consolidate and
grow. With respect to decreasing-returns-to-scale industries, the same reg-
ulator usually would promote competition among foreign producers. If lit-
tle domestic consumption and large levels of domestic production of the
good have occurred in its country, however, the regulator would tolerate or
even promote cartelization of the industry.
In sum, both uniform and selectively enforced competition law can
function as forms of trade protection. However, because selective enforce-
ment is harder to detect and monitor than a direct trade barrier, it may
pose a greater problem than conventional forms of protection. Uncertainty
about when competition law will apply may deter risk-averse actors and
require wasteful investments in precautions, such as legal services and lob-
bying. The ambiguous and elusive nature of this kind of protection also
may make it more difficult to mobilize coalitions to oppose it. By contrast,
conventional trade barriers, in the form of high tariffs or quotas, are quan-
titatively precise, are easier to detect and to oppose, and generally entail
lower costs of organizing opposition.35
2. Political Economy
The previous subsection premised its arguments on an unrealistic
assumption, namely that political decisionmakers seek to optimize the wel-
fare of the polity that they represent and govern. Positive theory predicts,
and plenty of evidence confirms, that in many situations governments will
pursue outcomes that reflect the preferences of homogenous and compact
34. See Guzman, Lesson, supra note 1, at 943; Guzman, International Antitrust, supra
note 1, at 1512-18.
35. See Alan 0. Sykes, Regulatory Protectionism and the Law of International Trade, 66
U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 9-11 (1999) (explaining the inefficiency of regulatory protection rela-
tive to tariff barriers to trade). See generally John 0. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian,
The World Trade Constitution, 114 HARV. L. REv. 511, 572-80 (2000) (discussing costs of
covert protection and its connection to nontransparent regulatory standards).
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interest groups at the expense of the general welfare. 36 Lower organiza-
tional costs enable some groups to elicit rents from government. One of
the best studied and documented examples of successful rent-seeking is
that of domestic producers seeking protection against foreign competition
to the detriment of domestic consumers. 37 Producers have focused identi-
ties and technological expertise; consumers suffer from an array of identi-
ties-worker, family member, sports fan-and lack specialized knowledge.
It is rational for producers to invest more than consumers do in obtaining
desired outcomes from government, and rational for politicians to provide
a return to this investment.
Political economy provides another set of explanations for variances
among national competition policies. The ability of particular groups to
minimize the costs of organization and political action must reflect differ-
ences in the way politics is carried out and financed as much as variety in
group characteristics. Therefore, we should not expect the winning groups
in different countries to be similar, much less benefit to the same extent.
To summarize, no conceptual reason exists for competition policy not
to serve the ends of trade protection, and both modern trade theory and
public choice theory identify incentives leading states to pursue policies
that lower global welfare. What still must be established is that states actu-
ally vary in the regulatory choices they make in the name of competition
policy, and that this variation is inefficient from a global perspective. A
secondary issue is whether states exploit the flexibility that competition
policy gives them to impose different regulatory choices on foreign produc-
ers in violation of their national treatment obligation. I consider evidence
of these practices in the next section.
36. The canonical texts discussing theories of public choice include JAMES M.
BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962); DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II (rev. ed.
1989); MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY
OF GROUPS (1971); Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for
Political Influence, 98 Qj. EcON. 371 (1983); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic
Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. ScI. 3 (1971) (framing the theory of public choice
as demand for and supply of regulation). But see Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic
Regulation, 5 BELL. J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 335, 339-41 (1974) (qualifying claims of
public choice theory).
37. The original insight is credited to Pareto. See VILFREDO PARETO, MANUAL OF POLIT-
ICAL ECONOMY 379 (Ann S. Schwier & Alfred N. Page eds., Ann S. Schwier trans., Augus-
tus M. Kelley Pub. 1971) (1927). For later works developing the same point, see
MUELLER, supra note 36, 238-42 (discussing rent-seeking through tariffs and quotas);
OLSON, supra note 36 (explaining why some groups are more able to exert influence on
government than others); Anne 0. Krueger, Government, Trade, and Economic Integra-
tion, 82 AMER. ECON. REV. 109, 110-11 (1992) (providing various examples of small,
well-organized interest groups extracting protective measures from the legislature). See
also Douglas A. Irwin & Randall S. Kroszner, Interests, Institutions, and Ideology in Secur-
ing Policy Change: The Republican Conversion to Trade Liberalization After Smoot-Hawley,
42 J.L. & ECON. 643, 651-66 (1999) (tracing shift away from protectionism to an
increase in influence of exporters, not of consumers).
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C. The Evidence
By hypothesis, in a world where international trade occurs, one and
only one competition policy can maximize global welfare. Any deviation
from that policy among states must reflect one of four considerations:
(1) The nonconforming law applies to an economic sector not subject
to international trade.
(2) The nonconforming law reflects a decision by the regulating state
to reduce the welfare of its subjects in pursuit of a policy goal that is not
amenable to a welfare calculus. (A variation on this consideration is that
people in different states may differ in their consumer preferences, and
thus the consumer welfare criterion may vary among states.)
(3) Variations in laws reflect genuine empirical disagreements among
regulators as to the consequences of particular regulatory choices.
(4) Variations in laws reflect efforts by a local population to exter-
nalize the costs of regulatory choices while capturing their benefits.
Consideration (1) is unlikely to explain differences between the major
developed countries, all of which have significant levels of international
trade. Consideration (2) seems implausible with respect to these states,
given the abundance of standardized consumer goods, as evidenced by
global brands that trade in these economies. Significant differences among
states in the content of their competition law-horizontal variation-could
reflect either consideration (3) or (4), and are not proof of welfare-reducing
deviations from an ideal global policy. Significant differences within states
as to the content of law applicable to domestic and foreign persons-verti-
cal variation-are consistent only with consideration (4). Moreover, the
presence of substantial vertical variation within a country at least hints
that its contribution to horizontal variation also reflects consideration (4).
Surveying the competition law and enforcement practices of the major
economic powers-the United States, the European Union, and Japan-we
find overwhelming evidence of horizontal variation and significant circum-
stantial evidence of vertical variation. This is enough at least to shift the
burden of proof to anyone who would deny that the competition laws of
these countries contribute to deadweight losses in the world economy. A
prima facie case thus can be made that the status quo of international
antitrust is suboptimal.
1. Horizontal Variation- Institutional Features
Differences in the institutional structures of the three principal eco-
nomic powers are evident. The United States disperses enforcement power
among two federal agencies, the Antitrust Division of the Justice Depart-
ment and the Federal Trade Commission, and private attorneys general,
who benefit from various financial incentives such as treble damages and
procedural advantages such as class actions, broad pretrial discovery, and
jury trials. A residual and ill-defined power of states to apply their own
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regulatory regimes further complicates the picture.3 8 In the European
Union, by contrast, the Competition Directorate of the European Commis-
sion has broad and preemptive power over enforcement.3 9 The fifteen
Member States have some residual power to regulate competition, but all
rely on a single national authority with virtually no private enforcement. 40
Lastly, Japan has a unified regulatory authority (the Fair Trade Commis-
sion), no subnational entities with regulatory powers, and high barriers to
private litigation.4 1 Some degree of collaboration between the government
and industry cartels exists, although scholars debate the extent and scale
of the government's contribution to these cartels.
4 2
2. Horizontal Variation- Substantive Aspects
The substantive goals of U.S. antitrust law reflect the shifting prefer-
ences of administrations as well as changes in the courts' understanding of
competition regulation. Over the last thirty years, U.S. regulators have
taken a more relaxed attitude toward forms of collusion and industrial con-
centration that seem driven by efficiency considerations. Consumer wel-
fare has become the touchstone of competition policy, as distinguished
from opposition to the accumulation of power and influence in the hands
of private firms.4 3 The courts too have moved in this direction, embracing
efficiency as the principal criterion for whether collusion and industrial
concentration are permissible and approving anticompetitive practices that
38. See ARC America Corp., 490 U.S. at 101-05 (holding that state antitrust laws
that create remedies not provided for under federal antitrust law are not preempted).
For discussion, see Richard A. Posner, Federalism and the Enforcement of Antitrust Laws
by State Attorneys General, in COMPETITION LAws IN CONFLICT, supra note 1, at 252;
Michael DeBow, State Antitrust Enforcement: Empirical Evidence and Modest Reform Pro-
posal, in COMPETITION LAWS IN CONFLICT, supra note 1, at 267.
39. See Notice on Cooperation Between National Courts and the Commission in
Applying Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty, 1993 OJ. (C 39) 1 12.
40. See id. 10.
41. See JOHN 0. HALEY, ANTITRUST IN GERMANY AND JAPAN: THE FIRST FIFTY YEARS,
1947-1998, at 71-90 (2001);J. MARK RAmSEYER & MINORU NAKAZATO, JAPANESE LAW: AN
ECONOMIC APPROACH 6-9 (1999); J. Mark Ramseyer, Lawyers, Foreign Lawyers, and Law-
yer-Substitutes: The Market for Regulation in Japan, 27 HARv. J. INT'L L. 499 (1986).
42. The traditional story of Japanese economic success between 1945 and 1990
stressed the role of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry ("MITI") in
directing, and even compelling, cooperation among producers. RONALD DORE, FLEXIBLE
RIGIDITIES: INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT IN THE JAPANESE ECONOMY,
1970-1980, at 128-49 (1986); CHALMERS JOHNSON, MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE: THE
GROWTH OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY, 1925-1975, at 157-97 (1982); EzRA F. VOGEL, JAPAN AS
No. 1: LESSONS FOR AMERICA 68-79 (1979). Recent work, however, argues convincingly
that this story fails to fit the evidence and instead reflects excessive reliance by foreign
scholars on the accounts of Japanese social scientists, whose stories in turn were shaped
by their Marxist or socialist ideologies. MITI failed to establish cartels that Japanese
industry did not want and could not immunize cooperative firms from prosecution by
the Fair Trade Commission. See Yoshiro Miwa &J. Mark Ramseyer, Capitalist Politicians,
Socialist Bureaucrats? Legends of Government Planning from Japan, 38 ANTITRUST BULL.
595, 598-599 (2003).
43. Gifford & Kudrle, supra note 10, at 220-23.
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plausibly may increase consumer welfare. 4 4 Finally, for sixty years, the
courts have permitted state-level experimentation with alternative
approaches to the trade-off between competition and collusion.45 In a
reversal of the normal preemption rule that underlies U.S. federalism,
state-administered collusion displaces federal regulation. 46
In form, the substantive goals of European Community ("EC") compe-
tition law seem virtually identical to those of the United States. 4 7 Articles
81 and 82 of the current revision of the Treaty of Rome closely track Sec-
tions 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. Article 81 prohibits "concerted prac-
tices" that "may affect trade between Member States" and "have as their
object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition." 48
Article 82 outlaws "any abuse" of "a dominant position."49 However, given
the cultural, economic, political, and sociological differences between the
two entities, it should surprise no one that these capacious words have
achieved a significantly different meaning in the EC. At the risk of oversim-
plification, EC competition law evinces greater skepticism about the bene-
fits of producer consolidation and cooperation than does recent U.S.
practice. 50 One aspect of this skepticism, not so much articulated as dis-
played, is concern about private concentrations of power threatening gov-
ernmental authority.5 1 In addition, EC competition law clearly opposes
the substitution of lower-level-that is national-supervision for Commu-
nity-administered competition policy. Unlike the United States, the lower-
level entities cannot authorizce anticompetitive practices. 5 2
An examination of specific policy issues further illuminates the differ-
ences between U.S. and EC law. No consensus exists on the distinction
between successful consolidation and the abuse of monopoly power, on
when vertical supply and purchase commitments encourage productive
44. See, e.g., Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 20-21
(effectively allowing an efficiency defense); FTC v. Univ. Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206,
1222-23 (11th Cir. 1991) (same); Rebel Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421,
1433 (9th Cir. 1995) (same). See generally Gifford & Kudrle, supra note 10, at 220-23
(discussing the evolution of the courts' approach to efficiency).
45. See DeBow, supra note 38 (describing state enforcement).
46. For description and criticism of this regime, see Frank H. Easterbrook, Antitriust
and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J.L. & ECON. 23 (1983).
47. At the risk of unnecessarily complicating things, I wish to preserve the distinc-
tion between the European Union, based on the Maastricht Treaty as amended, which
provides a framework for economic, foreign affairs, and police cooperation among the
twenty-five members, TREATY ON THE EUROPEAN UNION, Feb. 7, 1992, OJ. (C 191) 1
(1992), and the European Community, a legal structure created by the Treaty of Rome as
amended, TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY [hereinafter EC TREATY],
which provides the legal basis for economic regulation and, in particular, competition
law. Thus, one can say that EC competition law applies in the European Union. In
other words, the European Union is a place, while the European Community is a source
of law.
48. EC TREATY art. 81.
49. EC TREATY art. 82.
50. Fox, Races, supra note 1, at 1798.
51. Id. at 1793.
52. EC TREATY arts. 83(2)(e), 86(1), 87(1); Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R.
585, 593.
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firm-specific investments and when they unnecessarily restrict consumer
choice, or when predatory pricing constitutes a genuine threat to consumer
welfare and when the strategy contains the seeds of its own frustration,
thus making regulatory intervention unnecessary.5 3 Some of these differ-
ences undoubtedly reflect empirical uncertainty, but others suggest dis-
agreements over policy not caused by a commitment to maximizing either
global or local welfare.
Japan has the Antimonopoly Act, a substantive competition law that in
form follows closely that of the United States. But its Fair Trade Commis-
sion, although perhaps not quite the lapdog that some commentators por-
tray, has not had the opportunity to develop as rich and informative a
practice as have its U.S. and EU counterparts. It has brought criminal pros-
ecutions against core anticompetitive behaviors, such as price-fixing and
output restrictions undertaken by groups of producers. However, it has
not attacked other practices that result in significant costs to Japanese con-
sumers, and it has no influence on government policies that protect
numerous small producers from efficient competition by consolidated
firms.
5 4
3. Vertical Variation
Turning to evidence of vertical variation, one can describe incidents
where protection supplies the most plausible explanation for what hap-
pened. My examples are sufficiently representative to at least create a pre-
sumption that such protection through selective competition rules does
occur.
At the outset, note that for each of the major economic powers, the
institutional structure of competition law discussed above facilitates verti-
cal variation. The use of broad, nonspecific standards maximizes enforce-
ment discretion, as opposed to precise rules that would tie the enforcer's
hands. Of course, there exist other plausible explanations for the choice of
form. The enforcement bureaucracy may seek to maximize its discretion
for reasons unrelated to protection, and even a welfare-maximizing
lawmaker might regard bonding costs as unacceptably high relative to
53. Compare Cont'l TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (holding that
suppliers' promoting interbrand competition through vertical restrictions that limit the
number of retail franchises and restrict the sale of product does not violate the Sherman
Act), with Case 15/74, Centrafarm v. Sterling Drug, Inc. 1974 E.C.R. 1147, [1974] 2
C.M.L.R. 480 (1974) (holding that a trademark owner's increasing competition by
prohibiting or restricting the sale of the product in another Member State violates the
Treaty relating to the free movement of goods). For general discussion of substantive
differences between U.S. and EC competition law, see Gifford & Kudrle, supra note 10,
at 230-34. For debate within the academic community about the appropriate approach
to predatory pricing, compare JOHN R. Lor, JR., ARE PREDATORY COMMITMENTS CREDIBLE?:
WHO SHOULD THE COURTS BELIEVE? (1999) (concluding from empirical analysis that
predatory pricing is unlikely to occur in the private sector but that it can and does occur
in the public sector), with Peter H. Huang, Still Preying on Strategic Reputation Models of
Predation, 3 GREEN BAG 437 (2000) (arguing that predatory pricing commitments are
sometimes credible and thus could justifiably be regulated).
54. See HALEY, supra note 41, at 154-57, 162-68.
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other means of supervising the enforcement process. Nonetheless, it is rel-
evant, although by no means decisive, that the substantive competition
laws of the United States, the EC, and Japan all give regulators the kind of
discretion that impedes the detection of discrimination through monitor-
ing. The presence of motive and opportunity to discriminate against for-
eigners strengthens, although it does not prove, the case that these systems
promote vertical variation.
Examples from all three jurisdictions indicate that the discretion
enforcers enjoy has allowed actions that seem inexplicable except as a way
of advancing the interests of local producers. I begin with the United
States. Several recent suits brought by both the government and private
litigants reek of protectionism. During the run-up to the 1992 presidential
election, the George H.W. Bush Administration, pressed by candidate Clin-
ton's charges that it did not adequately protect U.S. producers from foreign
competitors, announced that it would abandon the Reagan Justice Depart-
ment's position that, except in limited instances, U.S. antitrust law would
not address foreign anticompetitive practices that had no significant impact
on U.S. consumer welfare.5 5 Once in power, the Clinton Administration
carried through on its campaign posture, bringing and settling a suit
against a British firm that allegedly imposed licensing restrictions on the
use of its patented technologies to restrict the production of flat glass man-
ufacturing outside the United States. 5 6 The following year, it obtained an
indictment against a Japanese paper company for participating in a con-
spiracy to fix the price of thermal fax paper.57 Both actions rested on dubi-
ous economic theories but succeeded in signaling a willingness to punish
foreign producers to the advantage of their U.S. competitors. 58
The private suit that most clearly reflects conventional trade protec-
tion is the epic battle between U.S. television set manufacturers and the
Japanese consumer electronic industry. The district court, the Third Cir-
cuit, and four Justices of the Supreme Court embraced a theory that pro-
ducer collusion in the Japanese market, coupled with successful price
competition in the U.S. market, sufficed to make out a violation of the
Sherman Act.59 This theory merges antitrust law with antidumping law,
inasmuch as the latter gives relief to U.S. producers seeking protection
from foreign competitors without requiring any proof of predation or other
harm to U.S. consumers. In effect, the U.S. television industry was seeking
compensation for its failure to compete with the Japanese producers. A few
55. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Enforcement Policy (1992), reprinted in 62 ANn-
TRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1560, at 483-84.
56. United States v. Pilkington plc, 1994-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 11 70,842 (D. Ariz.
1994). See also Complaint of the Attorney General of the United States, Pilkington plc
(No. 94-345); Response of the United States to Public Comments Concerning Proposed
Final Judgment, 59 Fed. Reg. 52,823 (1994).
57. United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1 (1997).
58. By contrast, the courts have shown no willingness to punish domestic producers
that collaborate with the U.S. government in inducing foreign producers to join a cartel.
See Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Kissinger, 506 F.2d 136-41 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
59. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
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years after a narrow majority of the Supreme Court rejected the suit, the
parallel with trade law was made explicit, as the U.S. government success-
fully collected antidumping duties based on the same evidence that the
U.S. industry had presented in its failed antitrust suit.60
Turning to the EU, one first notes the Commission's notorious refusals
to approve mergers of U.S. firms that compete with important European
producers, chief among them the failed Boeing-McDonnell Douglas trans-
action. 6 1 The suspicion that the Commission sought to give a leg up to
Airbus, Boeing's great rival, has been impossible to suppress. Merger regu-
lation hardly represents the only Commission activity that smacks of pro-
tectionism. Other examples involve prosecutions for abuse of dominant
position. This concept, although superficially similar to Section 2 of the
Sherman Act's prohibition of abuse of monopoly power, in practice has a
broader reach that seems to disproportionately target successful competi-
tion by non-EC firms.62 A classic case is its prosecution of United Brands,
an American banana producer.63 Not only did the Commission embrace
an improbable theory of abuse, but it acted against a background of Com-
munity trade regulation that systematically protected banana companies
located in former European colonies from competition by United Brands. 64
Consumer welfare, in particular that of banana-loving Germans, mattered
not at all here.
60. Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. United States, 755 F. Supp. 397 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1990).
Later, U.S. legislation closed the gap even further by requiring distribution of antidump-
ing (as well as countervailing) duties to protected domestic producers. Continued
Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, 19 U.S.C. § 1675c. The WTO in turn has
ruled that this legislation violated U.S. obligations under the Uruguay Round agree-
ments. World Trade Organization Appellate Body Report, United States- Continued
Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (Jan. 16, 2003), available at http://docson-
line.wto.org:80/DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/234ABR.doc.
61. Declaring a Concentration To Be Incompatible with the Common Market and
the EEA Agreement, 2001 OJ. (C 46) 3, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/compe-
tition/mergers/cases/decisions/m2220_en.pdf; see also Fox, Mergers, supra note 1 (dis-
cussing the implications of the failed merger between General Electric and Honeywell);
DanielJ. Gifford & E. Thomas Sullivan, Can International Antitrust Be Saved for the Post-
Boeing Merger World?: A Proposal To Minimize International Conflict and To Rescue Anti-
trust from Misuse, 45 ANTITRUST BULL. 55 (2000) (proposing a method for reducing
interjurisdictional conflicts in cross-border mergers).
62. For a more general argument by European scholars that the Commission
exploits its merger review for protectionist purposes, see NiHAT AKTAS ET AL., EUROPEAN
M&A REGULATION IS PROTECTIONIST (UCLA, Anderson School of Mgmt., Working Paper
No. 6-04, Mar. 6, 2004), available at http://www.anderson.ucla.edu/documents/areas/
fac/finance/6-04.pdf.
63. Case 27/76, United Brands Co. v. Comm'n, 1978 E.C.R. 207, 1 C.M.L.R. 429
(1978).
64. World Trade Organization Dispute Panel Report, European Communities-Regime
for the Importation, Sale, and Distribution of Bananas-Complaint by the United States
27-35 (May 22, 1997), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/
DS/27RUSA.WPF (asserting that the EU scheme regulating the banana trade was ille-
gal); World Trade Organization Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Regime
for Importation, Sale, and Distribution of Bananas 51-80 (Sept. 9, 1997), available at
http://docsonline.wto.org:80/DDFDocuments/v/WT/DS/27ABR.WPF (finding that the
banana trade regulatory scheme violated GATT).
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In Japan, prosecutions of foreign firms are not as prominent as toler-
ance of private collusion to keep out foreign competition. 65 In this respect,
Japanese competition policy represents the stance of much of the world
outside of North America and Europe.6 6 Weak or nonexistent regulation
of anticompetitive practices reflects the preferences of local producers, who
seek monopoly rents both through domestic collusion and obstruction of
import competition. 67 Some proponents of strategic trade theory initially
saw Japan's competition law as one element of a comprehensive trade and
development program. 6 8 More recent scholarship suggests that the govern-
ment simply accepts, and does not manage, industry-led cartelization.6 9 In
a complaint brought to the WTO, the United States argued that Japan's
tolerance of inefficient retail distribution systems constituted a trade bar-
rier in violation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"),
but the WTO rejected the claim.70
Finally, all major industrial economies display a particular kind of
substantive convergence. Virtually every country expressly exempts export
cartels from its competition law.7 1 This practice manifests a welfare calcu-
lation that gives no weight to foreign consumers, and suggests some indif-
ference to local consumers who probably bear some costs from foreign
export cartels. Regarding the exemption of export cartels as a global norm,
rather than as local aberrations from good competition policy, reinforces
the impression that competition law, among its many functions, serves as a
source of trade protection.
I do not maintain that these examples prove that competition law
inherently or primarily operates as a tool for protection. I argue only that
it is susceptible to such pressures, and that one can document instances
where countries have succumbed to these pressures. The evidence under-
mines the conception of competition policy as something separate from,
and motivated by different values than those driving, trade policy. Our
understanding of why states restrict international trade also may illumi-
nate our expectations about why and when governments, and, to a lesser
degree, private litigants, invoke competition law. This insight leads to an
obvious conclusion: If international cooperation is an effective means of
65. See Joel P. Trachtman, International Regulatory Competition, Externalization, and
Jurisdiction, 34 HARv. INT'L LJ. 47, 55 (1993).
66. See generally Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2004 National
Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers, available at http://www.ustr.gov/
assets/DocumentLibrary/ReportsPublications/2004/2004Nationa Trade-Estimate/
2004_NTEReport/assetuploadcfile2314191.pdf (reporting on barriers to U.S.
exports in fifty-three countries).
67. See McGinnis, supra note 1, at 568.
68. See JOHNSON, supra note 42, at 227.
69. See Miwa & Ramseyer, supra note 42, at 614-26.
70. World Trade Organization Panel Report, Japan-Measures Affecting Consumer
Photographic Film and Paper, (Mar. 31, 1998), available at http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop e/dispu e/44r03.pdf [hereinafter WTO, Photographic Film].
71. For a review of the practice, see Symposium in Honor of Professor James A. Rahl:
An International Antitrust Challenge, 10 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 98 (1989).
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advancing trade liberalization to the benefit of general welfare, then it will
lead us to a better international antitrust regime as well.
D. Summary
Competition policy embodies imprecise normative judgments that
invite controversy and defection rather than consensus and commitment.
Because its scope extends to such a wide range of economic activity, it has
the potential to inflict significant costs on many participants in interna-
tional trade. In particular, it tempts states both to impose nominally neu-
tral policies that favor local producers and consumers at the expense of
global welfare, and to administer their policies in a discriminatory fashion
to similar ends. Uncertainty about the willingness of states to pursue this
strategy further burdens international transactions.
If we cannot expect states to develop a coherent competition policy for
international transactions in the absence of coordination, should we seek
to create some mechanism that will coordinate national competition poli-
cies? What would such coordination look like, and what problems might it
engender? I now turn to these questions.
II. Visions of International Antitrust
The previous section establishes that states engaged in significant
international trade face strong incentives to adopt competition laws that do
not maximize global welfare. States whose producers mostly export, or
whose consumers do not have significant market power with respect to
foreign producers, have little need for competition laws at all, other than as
cosmetic gestures to appease foreign critics. Japan may be a case in point.
States that have significant market power, but do not provide a home to
producers, may insist on levels of competition that may benefit their con-
sumers but lower efficiency. States in a race to host increasing-returns-to-
scale industries may block consolidation by rival firms while protecting
the national champion. All states may avoid bright-line competition rules
in favor of nonspecific standards that permit selective prosecution of for-
eign producers to advance protectionist ends.
Each of these outcomes maximizes local welfare at the cost of global
efficiency. Superimposing the laws of multiple jurisdictions with different
standards on a single firm would function simply as a tax on firms that
operate internationally. And a tax on globalization seems perverse and
harmful.
What is to be done? Experts have suggested various strategies for har-
monizing and unifying global competition law. One would locate negotia-
tions over the content of an international agreement to harmonize
competition law in the WTO and give that organization the authority to
enforce such an agreement. The current WTO negotiations, the Doha
Round, have embraced competition law as a topic, although no concrete
proposal has yet emerged. Alternatively, the major economic powers might
agree to allocate regulatory jurisdiction in a way that minimizes conflicts
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among regulators. A series of bilateral agreements to which the United
States is a party represents a modest step in this direction, and scholars
have suggested other architectures for jurisdictional allocation. I first
describe what these proposals might look like and then discuss their
drawbacks.
A. International Coordination of the Substance of Competition Law
In both the United States and Europe, the history of competition regu-
lation has been one of gradual ascension from the smaller to larger political
units-in the United States from the states to the federal government, and
in Europe from nations to the EC. 72 Should this progression continue, so
that an international body would take on the responsibility of regulating
the competitive practices of international businesses? Proposals to do so
exist in both soft and hard versions.
1. Proposals for International Administration of Competition Law
Many, perhaps most, specialists writing on international antitrust
have supported, at a minimum, soft harmonization of competition laws
among states. For example, the OECD, a group that comprises the world's
richer nations, has promulgated guidelines for competition policy to which
its members should adhere. 73 These establish a minimum level of regula-
tion that each state should impose and also suggest a baseline to which
they should gravitate. 7 4 In 2000, the U.S. Justice Department's Interna-
tional Antitrust Advisory Committee called for greater standardization of
merger review, technical assistance to encourage the creation of competi-
tion policy and enforcement agencies in countries that have none, and the
gradual assimilation of international practice leading toward the standardi-
zation of competition policy rules. 75 This report led to the creation of the
International Competition Network ("ICN"), an international organization
of government regulators that sponsors conferences to promote
harmonization. 7 6
Andrew Guzman and Eleanor Fox would go further. Guzman has
called for the forging of an agreement on competition policy modeled on
72. See Spencer Weber Waller, The Internationalization of Antitrust Enforcement, 77
B.U. L. REv. 343, 352-60 (1997).
73. The documents take the form of Council Recommendations, which the OECD
publishes, along with documents on related issues, at hitp://www.oecd.org/document/
59/0,2340,en_2649_37463_459973911_1_37463,00.htm (last visited Aug. 24,
2004).
74. See, e.g., Recommendation of the Council Concerning Effective Action Against Hard
Core Cartels, OECD Doc. C (98) 35 (Mar. 25, 1998) available at http://webdominol.
oecd.org/horizontal\oecdacts.nsf/Display/EFE694B79F591D91C1256F2900OB403A?
OpenDocument (requiring member states to engage in consultation with other member
states regarding antitrust enforcement against cartels and urging member states to coop-
erate, for example, by aiding in discovery).
75. International Competition Policy Advisory Commission, U.S. Department ofJus-
tice Final Report (2000) available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/icpac/finalreport.htm.
76. See ICN Billboard, supra note 1; Ministerial Declaration, supra note 1; see also
Fox, Doha Dome, supra note 1, at 917, 929.
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the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
("TRIPS"). He would have the WTO serve as the forum for negotiating the
substance of such an agreement, as the agency that enforces the obliga-
tions imposed by the agreement, and as the adjudicator that resolves dis-
putes over the meaning of its provisions. Guzman argues that because
harmonization would require some states to forego regulatory choices that
would advance, at least in the short run, their national interests, negotia-
tions must take place in a structure that maximizes the opportunity for
winners to compensate losers with concessions in areas unrelated to com-
petition policy. The WTO, which has 147 member countries and is
involved in the regulation of trade in goods and services, intellectual prop-
erty, agriculture, health, safety, and some forms of investment, seems ideal
for such negotiations because of both its scale and scope.7 7
Guzman also has argued for changes in the organizational structure of
the WTO to accommodate its expanded jurisdiction. He calls for the divi-
sion of the organization into departments, each with responsibility for sub-
stantive areas such as trade, competition, environment, labor, and
intellectual property. Depicting these policy areas as rivalrous, he would
have each department act as an advocate for its particular subject and rely
on WTO internal dispute resolution processes to reach compromises. 78
The bold new world that Guzman hopes to usher in would entail a
single body of competition law applicable to firms operating internation-
ally. States would enforce this law, but a department of the WTO would
supervise their actions to ensure that they neither neglected their obliga-
tions nor exceeded the international regulatory limits. To the extent con-
ceptions of optimal competition law conflicted with those of, say,
intellectual property, labor standards, or food safety, the WTO would make
trade-offs and then require WTO members to honor them. 79
Fox has a less ambitious, or perhaps more idealistic, vision, although
hers shares essential elements with Guzman's. She would give the ICN a
greater role in formulating an international consensus on antitrust policy,
although she would rely on the WTO for administration and enforcement
of that consensus. She believes that states ultimately will develop a unified
sense of what constitutes an "antitrust harm" and will recognize a universal
right to address such harms.8 0 She does not invoke, but her argument
suggests, the rhetoric of international human rights law, which presup-
poses a cosmopolitan international commitment to the eradication of cer-
tain universally condemned practices.
2. Critique
In previous work, I have questioned the value of proposals such as
77. See Guzman, Lesson, supra note 1, at 951-56.
78. See Guzman, Global Governance, supra note 7, at 331-33, 341-45; Guzman,
International Antitrust, supra note 1, at 1545-46.
79. Id.
80. Eleanor M. Fox, The End of Antitrust Isolationism: The Vision of One World, 1992
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 221, 228-35 (1992).
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Guzman's and Fox's. 8 1 Summarizing my objections here, there are weak-
nesses in the concept of international cosmopolitanism; international
administration of nontransparent regulatory programs generally, and inter-
national dispute resolution derived from these programs in particular,
raise serious agency cost issues; executive branch representation of
national interests in international negotiations has potential drawbacks;
and unwinding failed international regulatory structures presents distinc-
tive difficulties. Taken together, these arguments lead one to search for
alternatives to the globalization of competition policy.
a) Cosmopolitanism
Fox invokes the spirit of cosmopolitanism to support an optimistic
account of why many far-flung states ultimately may reach a consensus on
the content of competition policy.8 2 This concept has become fashionable
lately in certain academic circles, although I do not know if Fox intends to
invoke all that its advocates assert. 83 International cosmopolitanism takes
Rawlsian arguments for justice to the international level, asserting that
thoughtful people would commit to a level of equality for all humans and
therefore would embrace massive transnational wealth transfers. In partic-
ular, because transnational wealth redistribution achieved by individual
actions seems overambitious and morally heroic, this body of thought justi-
fies strong redistributive programs by states.
84
Fox suggests that the broad claims of cosmopolitanism apply specifi-
cally to international antitrust. If one accepts the premise that variations
among national competition policies reflect differences in local welfare,
then any convergence toward a global standard would entail making some
groups in some countries better off and others worse off, and probably
would diminish the overall welfare of at least some countries, say OPEC
members. Recognition of a universal right of freedom from competitive
injury thus implies a commitment by states to international wealth
redistribution.
While arguments for equality and the redistribution needed to attain it
have a certain appeal, the ambitious claim of international cosmopolitan-
ism has serious difficulties. First, the idea that solidarity transcends dis-
tance-that people can identify with and care equally about persons at a
great cultural as well as physical remove-seems fanciful as a positive mat-
ter and problematic as a normative one. One does not have to surrender
any part of a core commitment to respect and care for all humans to recog-
81. See sources cited supra note 4.
82. Fox, Doha Dome, supra note 1, at 914 (referring to a "cosmopolitan understand-
ing" of antitrust); Eleanor M. Fox, Globalization and Human Rights: Looking Out for the
Welfare of the Worst Off, 35 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 201 (2002).
83. For a discussion and critique, see Jack L. Goldsmith, Liberal Democracy and Cos-
mopolitan Duty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1667 (2003).
84. See IRIS MARION YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY 236-71 (2000); Martha C.
Nussbaum, Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism, in FOR LOVE OF COUNTRY 2, 12 (Joshua
Cohen ed., 1996); Tomas W. Pogge, An Egalitarian Law of Peoples, 23 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
195 (1994).
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nize both that people flourish among their familiars, and that a great varia-
tion in culture and environment reflects the natural and desirable variety
of humans and their corresponding social needs. Rawls recognized this
problem when he limited his call for international justice to nations shar-
ing similar values and political systems.8 5 Jack Goldsmith has observed
that, to the extent state policies reflect the preferences of subjects
expressed through the processes of liberal democracy, state actors are justi-
fied in taking these affinities into account.8 6
Second, implicit in the cosmopolitan argument is an equation of finan-
cial resources with freedom from physical brutality. It is easy to derive
from Rawlsian principles a commitment to protect all people from murder,
torture, and other forms of state cruelty, and the cosmopolitan position
simply extends the point to material well-being. However, this equation of
physical integrity and economic status is more slippery than the cosmopol-
itan argument acknowledges. Communities vary wildly in how they
express and value economic status. Wealth is a social, and therefore local,
artifact to a far greater extent than is physical inviolability.8 7
Third, wealth transfers require exactions from the source of wealth, as
a voluntary surrender of resources never seems to suffice. Thus, the threat
of force, even if only in the form of economic sanctions, is a necessary
complement to a redistributive project. This in turn means that the risk of
international conflict is deeply embedded in international redistribution.
In the case of competition policy, enforcement of a common norm would
entail some entity authorized to impose sanctions on shirkers and
malfeasors. However, one cannot contemplate the use of force without con-
ceding the possibility of its abuse. At its heart, then, the cosmopolitan
position, both in general and with respect to international antitrust, con-
tains a commitment to international coercion that requires critical
examination.
b) Agency Costs of International Entities
Designing an international body to administer and enforce an agree-
ment on substantive competition policy presents serious issues of institu-
tional design and incentives. It is useful to conceptualize such a body as
the agent of the various states that collectively wish to implement an agree-
ment on competition policy, much as the managers of a business serve as
the agents of the firm's investors. In both cases, the fundamental problem
involves aligning the agent's interests with the interests of its principal to
maximize the value of the agency relationship. The principal-the states
seeking to implement a collective competition policy-cannot fully antici-
pate how it wants the agent-here the WTO or some comparable body-to
respond to future problems. The principal understands that the agent
85. JOHN RAwLs, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 35-44 (1999).
86. Goldsmith, supra note 83, at 1677-80.
87. 1 do not mean to deny the Foucaldian point that physical invasion has aspects of
social construction. My point is a relative one, that perceptions of wealth depend more
on social structure than do perceptions of pain.
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might want to maximize some good-its budget, power, glory, leisure, or
compensation-that the principal itself would not want maximized. The
principal must respond to this challenge by structuring the agency rela-
tionship so as to limit, ex ante, the agent's discretion, what the literature
calls bonding, or by supervising what the agent does ex post, what the
literature calls monitoring; otherwise, it will be subjected to tolerating out-
comes that do not reflect its own preferences. 88
Just as investors cannot just hand over their money to managers and
ask only that the managers maximize their return, states cannot ask an
international organ simply to choose a competition policy that maximizes
global welfare. They must accept the risk that the organ will make subop-
timal choices-perhaps embracing a harebrained economic theory or using
competition law as a guise to advance some redistributive project-or rein
in its discretion through some mix of bonding and monitoring. Bonding,
however, forecloses some policy responses that, in hindsight, would turn
out to be optimal. Monitoring consumes resources and, if coupled with a
right of retaliation, also may induce unwarranted conservatism in the
organ's officials.
These are general problems that have turned out not to be insur-
mountable in many instances. In the case of international antitrust how-
ever, they loom especially large. Two features of competition policy
exacerbate the agency problems accompanying a delegation to an interna-
tional organization. First, the absence of any clear understanding or defini-
tion of good competition policy makes bonding more problematic. The
architects of an international regime must either find the few areas where
clarity and consensus exist and settle for a seriously incomplete regime, or
they must trust an international organ with broad discretion. Second,
because it is likely that any universal competition regime that increases
global welfare will make some countries worse off, effective monitoring of
the organ's performance will only clarify the scope of the injury particular
states will experience. 8 9
The history of the GATT and its successor, the WTO, illustrates why
adding competition policy to the WTO's already significant responsibilities
may not work. The GATT's great achievement was postwar liberalization of
the international economy through tariff reduction.90 High tariffs are an
ideal subject for international cooperation. This form of protection neither
disguises itself nor hides its effects. Tariffs single out goods traded interna-
tionally for special excises stated in precise quantitative terms, and quanti-
fication of their effects presents no great challenge. Thus, reciprocal tariff
88. See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Man-
agerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976) (ana-
lyzing bonding and monitoring as a response to the agency problem between
shareholders and managers).
89. See generally Stephan, Courts, supra note 4, at 346-49 (discussing the agency
problems involved in internationalizing antitrust).
90. J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 36 (1969).
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reduction agreements are easy to negotiate, compliance with them is easily
monitored, and generally, they do not produce sore losers.
Conversely, when regulation takes the form of case-by-case application
of general standards that are shaped by complex policy goals and that
carry significant potential for international wealth redistribution, those
affected by the regulation and those who impose it cannot easily commit to
a mutually beneficial agreement. 9 1 The experience of the last two decades
illustrates the point. The shift in the international trade regime's focus to
nontariff trade barriers, including health and safety rules and environmen-
tal regulations, has embroiled the WTO in great controversy. The agree-
ments giving the WTO this authority largely involve ambiguous
commitments that raise profound interpretative problems. The efforts of
the WTO organs to apply these standards to concrete cases has triggered
intransigence on the part of the states accused of violations, sharp criti-
cism of the dispute resolution process within the community of trade
experts, and passionate attacks from populist forces.9 2
The WTO has had little direct involvement with competition policy,
but the few instances in which it has engaged these problems illustrate the
shortcomings of international supervision of national competition law. In
the Kodak-Fujitsu dispute, the WTO dispute settlement process rejected
the claim that Japan's tolerance of inefficient retail distribution networks,
which impeded the entry of foreign products, constituted an impermissible
trade barrier.9 3 The case had murky facts and suffered from less than deft
advocacy by the United States, but it still suggests the difficulty of detecting
disguised protection. Arguably, Japan tolerates the gross inefficiencies of
small scale retail outlets in part because this structure protects domestic
producers from foreign competition. 9 4 However, the inference necessary to
reach this conclusion was beyond the grasp of the WTO.
A symmetrical dispute involving U.S. antitrust law reinforces the
point. The case involved a European attack on the Anti-Dumping Act of
1916. 95 This statute, as interpreted by the U.S. courts, simply recapitu-
lated the substantive requirements of a predatory pricing violation under
91. McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 35, at 566-72.
92. See, e.g., Robert Howse & Elisabeth Tuerk, The WTO Impact on Internal Regula-
tions-A Case Study of the Canada-EC Asbestos Dispute, in THE EU AND THE WTO: LEGAL
AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 283, 283-86 (Grainne de BIrca & Joanne Scott eds:, 2001);
Alan 0. Sykes, Domestic Regulation, Sovereignty, and Scientific Evidence Requirements: A
Pessimistic View, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 353 (2002) (discussing technical barriers to trade and
the WTO dispute resolution process); Tarullo, supra note 1, at 494 & n.57 (discussing
institutional challenges to the WTO's dispute resolution process and citing disputes
involving meat hormone regulations, preferences for former colonies in banana imports,
and dolphin protection measures in tuna imports).
93. WTO, Photographic Film, supra note 70, at 228. For discussion, see Stephan,
Courts, supra note 4, at 348-49; Stephan, Sheriff, supra note 4, at 58-61; Tarullo, supra
note 1, at 484.
94. WTO, Photographic Film, supra note 70, at 202-16.
95. World Trade Organization Appellate Body Report, United States-Anti-Dumping
Act of 1916, available at http://docsonline.wto.org:80/DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/
136ABR.doc [hereinafter WTO, Anti-Dumping].
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the Sherman Act.9 6 No criminal or civil suit under the 1916 Act had ever
succeeded. But, because in form, the 1916 Act regulates dumping in a mat-
ter not authorized by the WTO agreements, the WTO condemned it as vio-
lating U.S. obligations under the 1994 Agreement on Anti-Dumping
Duties.9 7
Formalism provides the key to understanding both decisions. The
WTO has not found it possible to deal with costly but hard-to-prove de
facto discrimination, but had no difficulty with a purely hypothetical case
of de jure discrimination. 98 Transparent but innocuous conduct brought
about WTO condemnation, while nontransparent but potentially harmful
conduct generated no response. Both decisions reflect a reluctance to stray
from the uncontroversial meaning of the agreements that form the organi-
zation's charter, even at the cost of the substantive ends that these agree-
ments purportedly pursue. One cannot expect much more from any future
agreement on competition policy.
As noted above, Guzman appreciates the present deficiencies of the
WTO. His response to this challenge is Weberian. He would rely on
bureaucratic rationality embodied in distinct, policy-defined departments
to formulate good policy and negotiate the competing interests.9 9 In effect,
he would replace national governments representing the material interests
of their producers and consumers with technocratic elites guided by sub-
stantive expertise.
The ambition of this proposal is so remarkable that one wonders
where to begin a critique. 10 0 The classic concern about bureaucratic
rationality is that it masks a powerful urge for aggrandizement. In the
international arena, we have few if any examples of agencies that have
avoided the temptation. Budgets grow, capacities for effective intervention
decline, and faith in international policymaking falters, only to rise up
again in new areas. Geneva seems a graveyard for past idealism, not a hot-
bed of innovative solutions to the world's problems.
c) Dispute Resolution
Limiting an international agency to the task of settling disputes over
the meaning and application of an international agreement does not avoid
the agency problems discussed in the prior section. 10 1 U.S. practice illus-
96. See In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 807 F.2d 44, 47-49 (3d Cir.
1986).
97. WTO, Anti-Dumping, supra note 95, 1 155 at 41. After the WTO decision, one
litigant did persuade a federal district court that the 1916 Act requires a lesser showing
from a plaintiff than does a predatory pricing claim under the Sherman Act. Goss Int'l
Corp. v. Tokyo Kikai Seisakusho, Ltd., 321 F. Supp. 2d 1039 (N.D. Iowa 2004).
98. For discussion, see Stephan, Courts, supra note 4, at 349.
99. See Guzman, Global Governance, supra note 7, at 307-09.
100. For a discussion that anticipates Guzman's proposal and, to my view, advances
devastating objections, see McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 35, at 552-66.
101. But see id. at 572-89 (arguing that the WTO dispute resolution is beneficial). I
consider the McGinnis-Movsesian argument strongest where the WTO addresses dis-
putes over clear and therefore transparent principles. As the clarity of the principle dis-
sipates, so does the likelihood of efficacious dispute resolution.
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trates how the application of indeterminate standards shifts discretionary
authority and the capacity to shape policy to the dispute resolution body.
In the United States, antitrust law is what the courts say it is, largely with-
out congressional input into the policy's content. 10 2 In theory, an interna-
tional tribunal might follow in the footsteps of the U.S. judiciary and
become the principal source of international competition law. In reality,
this hope is implausible.
U.S. federal judges have life tenure and a great fund of social capital.
They come to the bench after achieving distinction in any of a number of
legal fields, and they wind up on the Supreme Court after facing intense
public scrutiny and surviving a daunting political gauntlet. They benefit
from a tradition of judicial lawmaking that, for the most part, has gained
acceptance and even admiration from the general public.
None of these statements can be made about the members of the WTO
dispute settlement bodies or, for that matter, any adjudicator in the inter-
national system. The members of the WTO appellate body, the closest ana-
log to a common law appellate court, serve for four years, with nomination
and replacement at the pleasure of specific countries or blocs, rather than
of the WTO membership as a whole. 10 3 Given this short leash, the possi-
bility for articulating and imposing a competition policy that any signifi-
cant state finds undesirable seems unlikely except over the very short
run. 104
d) Executive Branches as National Agents
In both international bargaining and monitoring of international agen-
cies, states act through their executives, not their parliaments. For states
operating under some version of the Westminister system, where the lead-
ing parliamentary party forms the executive, this point may not have much
significance. However, even in these countries, actors within the executive
may have interests that diverge from those of the legislature, including pos-
sibly a preference for larger budgets, projects that show off the executive to
good effect, and work that increases the actors' future returns from their
postpolitical careers. Further, in many states, the executive operates under
the influence of a different political party from that enjoying dominance in
the legislature. This separation may exist even if the executive answers
directly to parliament, as in those Westminister-type systems in which no
single party controls the legislature.
I previously have argued that these factors may express themselves as
a tendency of governments to commit to harmonization and unification
projects that produce little hard law but provide officials with high-profile
102. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59-60 (1911) (concluding that
the Sherman Act must be applied with the "rule of reason," giving courts more discretion
than under a per se test).
103. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
Apr. 15, 1994, art. 17, § 2, WTO Agreement, Annex 2, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF
THE URUGUAY ROUND vols. 28-30, 33 I.L.M. 1168.
104. See Stephan, Courts, supra note 4, at 337-38.
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venues to display themselves.' 0 5 One might even suggest that the ICN is a
manifestation of this tendency. These efforts may seem harmless enough,
but they have the potential to destabilize the legal environment in which
firms operate. They may distract individual states from desirable changes
in their competition laws, induce cosmetic changes to appeal to the inter-
national audience, and send confusing signals to bureaucrats and judges
responsible for interpreting and applying national law.
B. Inflexibility in the Face of Changed Circumstances
Law-based international institutions are hard to create and even
harder to reform. The principle of unanimity that applies to treaty systems
means that amendments, like the initial institution, require unanimous
consent. As circumstances change, it often becomes desirable to alter the
mandate and tools of the regime, but holdouts are likely. For this reason,
international regimes tend to administer broad standards and norms rather
than precise rules, and they tend to collapse or become irrelevant rather
than reform themselves. Important counterexamples exist, but compared
to both private firms and states, international organizations manifest infer-
ior adaptive capability. 0 6
C. International Coordination of Regulatory Jurisdiction
Recognizing the many obstacles to substantive harmonization of com-
petition law, some governments and commentators have considered coor-
dination of jurisdiction as an alternative way of addressing the overlapping
jurisdiction problem. 10 7 The ideal is universal acceptance of jurisdictional
criteria that would submit transactions to one, and only one, regulatory
authority. The search for jurisdictional stability underlay the forty-year
struggle between the United States and its trading partners over the
"effects" test for antitrust jurisdiction as well as justifying the various agree-
ments between the Justice Department and other states on antitrust
enforcement. 1 0 8
1. Allocations of Regulatory Jurisdiction
In a simpler world of mechanical and formalistic jurisdictional tests,
overlapping regulatory authority did not pose a problem. Only the sover-
eign on whose territory a transaction occurred would impose its rules. 10 9
105. See Stephan, Accountability, supra note 4, at 695-97.
106. Cf. ALBERT 0. HiRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY (1970) (discussing adaptive
pressures on firms and states).
107. For a thorough review of the literature, see generally Joel P. Trachtman, Economic
Analysis of Prescriptive Jurisdiction, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (2001).
108. See International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6201-12
(1994) (authorizing the Department of justice to enter into agreements with foreign anti-
trust authorities to exchange information to facilitate antitrust enforcement). Agree-
ments entered into by the Department of Justice pursuant to the International Antitrust
Enforcement Assistance Act can be found at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/interna-
tional/intarrangements.htm.
109. See Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 359 (1909).
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With the rise of multijurisdictional transactions however, territoriality
came under pressure. U.S. courts first relaxed the territorial test by requir-
ing that only some part of the transaction in question occur in U.S. terri-
tory.1 10 By the end of World War II, the lower courts cast aside even that
constraint, instead applying U.S. antitrust law to any action that had direct
and intended effects in the United States."' Initially, Europe and the
Commonwealth countries resisted this approach, but by the end of the
1980s the EC had incorporated the effects test into its own competition
law.1 1
2
Almost as soon as the effects test emerged as the U.S. standard for
international antitrust, some courts and commentators proposed to limit
it. It is unclear whether the critics foresaw the potential costs of multiple
regulation or simply disliked the foreign criticism that the test generated.
For whatever reason, their efforts dominated most discussion of interna-
tional antitrust during the 1970s and 1980s. The leading treatise on inter-
national antitrust proposed that courts use a "rule of reason" based on
multiple criteria to limit U.S. jurisdiction in cases that otherwise satisfied
the effects test. 113 The object of the test was to restrict the exercise of juris-
diction in some instances where the effects test would permit regulation. It
did not purport to create a world where every transaction would have one
and only one regulator, but it did aspire to reduce the instances of multiju-
risdictional conflicts.
The Ninth Circuit embraced the rule-of-reason standard, and the Third
Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States proclaimed it
the general norm. 1 4 The campaign to limit antitrust jurisdiction suffered
a setback in 1993, when, in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California,1 15 a
narrow majority of the Supreme Court both endorsed the effects test and
rejected the rule-of-reason limitation. In 2004, however, the Court in dicta
seemed to reinstate this limitation.
1 6
As this account illustrates, disputes over jurisdictional scope typically
take place in the judicial arena. Legislators typically fail to address the
issue of extraterritorial regulation, and courts usually craft choice-of-law
rules to fill in statutory lacunae. In the case of antitrust, however, some
110. See United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268, 275-76 (1927).
111. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 443-44 (2d
Cir. 1945).
112. See Case 89/95, In re Wood Pulp Cartel, 1988 E.C.R. 5193, 5242-43 (1988)
(embracing form of effects test); James J. Friedberg, The Convergence of Law in an Era of
Political Integration: The Wood Pulp Case and the Alcoa Effects Doctrine, 52 U. PITT. L.
REv. 289, 309-18 (1991) (describing the history of EC resistance to effects test).
113. See 1 JAMES R. ATWOOD & KINGMAN BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERIcAN BUSINESS
ABROAD 166 (1981) (referring to the rule-of-reason standard as a "balancing process").
114. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403 (1987).
115. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
116. F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd. v. Empagran, S.A., 124 S.Ct. 2359, 2370 (2004)
(invoking rule of reason to interpret international scope of Sherman Act in light of 1982
amendments and noting that Hartford distinguished because it involved direct injuries
to the U.S. market).
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intergovernmental agreements also seek to distribute regulatory jurisdic-
tion. The U.S. Justice Department has negotiated compacts with Australia,
Canada, the EU, Japan, and Mexico, among others. 117
Superficially, these agreements appear to address the problems of
overlapping regulation. A review of their terms, however, reveals that they
do not even create soft law. Rather, the bilateral agreements express only a
desire to consult and cooperate, and do not limit the discretion of any regu-
latory authorities." 8 None of these instruments has terms that a U.S.
court could enforce, and the United States-EC agreement only provides the
EC Commission with additional grounds for making demands of national
regulators. 11 9 All but the agreement with Australia purport to embrace the
rule of reason as the basic concept for allocating regulatory jurisdiction,
but all use a long list of unweighted criteria that have the effect of insulat-
ing almost all exercises of regulator review from attack. 120 Moreover, the
agreements do not seek to coordinate merger approval, the area that has
caused the greatest recent tension. If anything, the bilateral agreements
illustrate the conflicting interests that jurisdictions have in imposing their
competition law on international transactions and the difficulties of sur-
rendering regulatory discretion in spite of the potential benefits obtained
by a reduction of overlapping constraints on private transactors.
Finally, one should note the ongoing negotiations regarding a Hague
Convention on International Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters. 12 1 This multilateral instrument, if adopted,
might limit the power of a signatory state to exercise some regulatory juris-
diction over extraterritorial transactions, and would make civil judgments
117. For texts of the agreements, see http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/international/
intarrangements.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2004).
118. See Agreement on Mutual Antitrust Enforcement Assistance, Apr. 27, 1999, U.S.-
Austl., art. II, § A, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/international/docs/
usaus7.htm [hereinafter Australia Antitrust Agreement]; Agreement Regarding the Appli-
cation of Their Competition and Deceptive Marketing Practices Laws, Aug. 1995, U.S.-
Can., art. Ill, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/international/docs/
uscan721.pdf [hereinafter Canada Antitrust Agreement]; Agreement Regarding the
Application of Their Competition Laws, Sept. 23, 1991, U.S.-E.C., art. IV, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/international/docs/ec.htm [hereinafter EC Antitrust
Agreement]; Agreement Concerning Cooperation on Anticompetitive Activities, Oct. 7,
1999, U.S.-Japan, art. IV, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/international/
docs/3740.pdf [hereinafter Japan Antitrust Agreement]; Agreement Concerning the
Application of Their Competition Laws, July 15, 2000, U.S.-Mex., art. Ill, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/icpac/5145.pdf [hereinafter Mexico Antitrust Agreement].
119. See EC Antitrust Agreement, supra note 118, arts. VI, VII.
120. Agreement on the Application of Positive Comity Principles to the Enforcement
of Their Competition Laws, Oct. 5, 2004, U.S.-Can., art. IV, available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/international/docs/205732.pdf; Agreement on the Applica-
tion of Positive Comity Principles in the Enforcement of Their Competition Laws, June
3-4, 1998, U.S.-E.C., art. IV, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/interna-
tional/docs/1781.htm; Japan Antitrust Agreement, supra note 118, arts. V, VI; Mexico
Antitrust Agreement, supra note 118, arts. V, VI.
121. Hague Conference on Private International Law, Preliminary Draft Convention
on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Oct. 30, 1999,
available at http://hcch.e-vision.nl/upload/wop/jdgm-drafte.pdf.
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produced by proceedings that conform to the convention subject to execu-
tion by all parties to the Convention. 1 2 2 However, no one who follows
these negotiations seriously believes that the United States will sign the
Convention or that Congress would accede to it. Rather, even this modest
attempt to reach an international consensus on the allocation of regulatory
jurisdiction seems an entirely academic exercise.
To summarize, the courts have supplied three different strategies for
allocating regulatory jurisdiction. The territorial approach would severely
limit the scope of competition law in cases where production took place
offshore. The effects test maximizes a state's regulatory power. The rule of
reason muddles these two approaches. In theory, states might agree to
concrete and specific allocations of authority, but nothing achieved to date
meets this description. To the contrary, the agreements we have suggest
the difficulty of imposing significant constraints on national regulatory
power.
2. Critique
The use of rules that allocate regulatory jurisdiction as a substitute for
unification of substantive law is most closely associated with U.S. corpo-
rate law. During the last decade Roberta Romano has produced an influ-
ential reappraisal of this subject. 12 3 Her work has developed a conceptual
apparatus that translates into other substantive areas and, in due course,
has led to a rich and lively scholarly debate about regulatory competition
generally. 1 2 4
As Romano observed, the challenge is choosing jurisdictional criteria
that will not promote a flight of transactions to a jurisdiction that permits
significant externalization of the transactions' Costs. 1 2 5 Her work is a
response to the traditional critique of the formalistic U.S. choice-of-law rule
for corporate law-the law of the place of incorporation applies-which
asserts that managers incorporate in jurisdictions that maximize their
122. See id. at arts. 4, 18.
123. ROBERTA ROMANO, THE ADVANTAGE OF COMPETITIVE FEDERALISM FOR SECURITIES
REGULATION (2002) [hereinafter ROMANO, COMPETITIVE FEDERALISM]; ROBERTA ROMANO,
THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993) [hereinafter ROMANO, GENIUS]; Roberta
Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J.
2359 (1998).
124. See generally INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY COMPETITION AND COORDINATION: PER-
SPECTIVES ON ECONOMIC REGULATION IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES (William W. Brat-
ton et al. eds., 1996) (presenting the views of various legal experts and social scientists
on how legal institutions will be affected by international trade); William W. Bratton &
Joseph A. McCahery, The New Economics of Jurisdictional Competition: Devolutionary Fed-
eralism in a Second-Best World, 86 GEo. L.J. 201 (1997) (discussing the development of
economic theories of jurisdictional competition); Trachtman, supra note 65 (arguing that
the principle of subsidiarity should be applied to determine when to allow regulatory
competition). Earlier influential work includes Wallace E. Oates & Robert M. Schwab,
Economic Competition Among Jurisdictions: Efficiency Enhancing or Distortion Inducing,
35 J. PUB. ECON. 333 (1988); Easterbrook, supra note 23; Saul Levmore, Interstate
Exploitation and Judicial Intervention, 69 VA. L. REV. 563 (1983); Charles M. Tiebout, A
Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956).
125. See ROMANO, COMPETITIVE FEDERALISM, supra note 123, at 83-86.
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opportunities to enrich themselves at the expense of investors. The "race to
the bottom" metaphor arose in this context.'
26
Romano demonstrated that managers often will have to internalize the
costs associated with rules that enabled them to exploit investors, and thus
should have a preference for rules that maximize firm value.' 2 7 She found
in corporate law a virtuous race to the top, where her predecessors had
seen only a regrettable regulatory collapse. Stephen Choi and Andrew
Guzman extended her argument to the international arena, advocating a
regime that would allow the issuers of securities to choose which jurisdic-
tion would regulate their transactions. 1 28
A consensus does not exist regarding the validity of Romano's empiri-
cal claims about U.S. corporate law, much less Choi and Guzman's exten-
sion. The debate focuses mostly on the supply rather than the demand
side, involving arguments over the willingness of states to compete for cor-
porate charters. 129 Most scholars, however, agree with the analytics under-
lying Romano's claim. The degree to which formal and transactionally
determinable choice-of-law rules should apply depends primarily on exter-
nalities. 13 0 To the extent that the ratio of externalized costs to benefits
matches that of those internalized, the transactors, at least if they meet
minimum standards of competence, should have the freedom to choose
their regulatory environment. Under these conditions, a race to the top can
occur.
Using Romano's framework, the argument that competition regulation
is susceptible to a race to the bottom, and therefore should not be subject to
transactor choice, is straightforward. At its heart, competition law involves
producer conduct, either unilateral or in concert, that may have harmful
126. See William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections on Delaware, 83
YALE L.J. 663, 666, 705 (1974). For earlier discussion of the problem, see ADOLPH A.
BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
127-52 (1932).
127. See RoMANo, GENIUS, supra note 123, at 33-36.
128. See Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the
International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903, 914-41 (1998);
Andrew T. Guzman, Capital Market Regulation in Developing Countries: A Proposal, 39
VA. J. INT'L L. 607. 625-44 (1999). Other commentators proposing similar regimes
include John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing Toward the Top?: The Impact of Cross-Listings and Stock
Market Competition on International Corporate Governance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1757,
1769-79 (2002); Roberta Romano, The Need for Competition in International Securities
Regulation, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 387, 389-415 (2001); Stephan, Virtue, supra note
4, at 193-96; Frederick Tung, Passports, Private Choice, and Private Interests: Regulatory
Competition and Cooperation in Corporate, Securities and Bankruptcy Law, 3 CHI. J. INT'L
L. 369, 377-88 (2002).
129. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuck & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely
Walk: Reconsidering the Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553 (2002);
Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice Is Not Inves-
tor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1340-43 (1999); Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar,
The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679, 724-30 (2002).
130. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Efficient Capital Markets, Corporate Disclosure, and
Enron, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 394 (2004) (discussing the Enron scandal); Mark J. Roe,
Delaware's Competition, 117 HARv. L. REV. 588 (2003) (discussing the impact of federal
regulation on Delaware's competition for corporate charters).
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effects on consumers. Allowing producers to choose which regime will reg-
ulate the harm they impose on consumers would make sense only if con-
sumers could boycott producers that choose consumer-unfriendly regimes.
However, competition law, at least in theory, focuses on exactly the kinds
of producer actions that reduce consumer choice. If the touchstone is the
likelihood of externalities, producer choices about competition law gener-
ally should have no significance. 1 3 -
Straightforward analysis also demonstrates that none of the three rules
used by the courts for allocating state regulatory jurisdiction will produce
optimal outcomes. 13 2 First, a universal commitment to territoriality would
prevent a state from regulating offshore producers intending to limit com-
petition in the state's market, thus creating inefficiencies. Barring all such
desirable regulation can be justified only if one can demonstrate that on
balance extraterritorial regulation would decrease welfare. Some states,
however, might limit competition rules to cases that both maximize effi-
ciency and increase consumer welfare. Moreover, in industries where pro-
duction is moveable and firms thus can induce states to compete for their
activities, producers would exploit a territoriality regime to move to states
with producer-friendly regimes.
Symmetrical arguments expose the flaws in the effects test. That
approach multiplies the number of states with jurisdiction over transac-
tions and thus increases the likelihood that private organizational deci-
sions will confront governmental resistance. As with the territorial rule,
whether governmental intervention will increase welfare constitutes an
empirical consideration. There is no categorical reason to believe that the
benefits from desirable competition rules permitted by the effects test nec-
essarily will be greater than the costs generated by inefficient regula-
tion.133 The most one can claim for the effects test is that it maximizes
sovereignty by allowing states to choose the scope of their regulation free
131. Some subjects, such as contracts implementing vertical cooperation, may pre-
sent sufficiently debatable competition issues to justify deference to the transactors. See
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (enforc-
ing contractual choice-of-forum provision in cross-border dispute). These contracts typi-
cally involve merchants who have some competitive choices before their entry into the
agreement and involve project-specific investments that on balance may increase welfare.
See generally Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA.
L. REV. 1089 (1981) (arguing that relational contracts, including exclusive dealing agree-
ments, allow for proper risk allocation in complex transactions). Under these circum-
stances, the parties are more likely to internalize the costs of whatever competition
regime they choose, and, without the freedom to choose, they may pass up valuable
transactions.
132. See Guzman, Choice of Law, supra note 33, at 904-13.
133. William Dodge argues that courts should express a bias in favor of overregula-
tion on the ground that special interests find it easier to block regulation they disfavor
than to have enacted legislation that they favor. William S. Dodge, An Economic Defense
of Concurrent Antitrust Jurisdiction, 38 TEx. INT'L L.J. 27, 33-35 (2003). The argument
confuses prudential concerns with welfare claims. Courts might defer to legislative
choices about jurisdiction on the ground that they do not have the capacity to second-
guess legislative choices. However, it does not follow that because special interests have
a comparative advantage in blocking adverse legislation, only public-regarding regula-
tion will pass through this filter. It is just as plausible that we see less legislation than
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of international constraints. But maximization of sovereign choice is not
necessarily a good thing. Arguments for expanding individual choice do
not translate to the level of the state. 13 4
The one approach that seems unambiguously flawed is the rule of rea-
son. William Dodge misstates the case when he characterizes this
approach as producing the same outcome as the territorial method. 13 5
Rather, the rule of reason only increases the likelihood that one state, pre-
sumably the place of production, will impose its competition rules. Unlike
either the territoriality rule or the effects test, however, the rule of reason
contains a high degree of instability and unpredictability. It allows courts
to balance unweighted factors on an ex post basis, making reliable guesses
about regulatory jurisdiction difficult if not impossible. It creates legal risk
without eliminating the costs of either under- or overregulation.
If the judicially crafted formulas for allocating jurisdiction produce
suboptimal outcomes, should governments enter into agreements to allo-
cate regulatory jurisdiction? The extant agreements suggest that we
already have reached the limits of state-to-state bargains. No state seems
willing to submit to serious and enforceable constraints on its regulatory
jurisdiction. Two reasons for this reluctance suggest themselves. First,
states will not surrender jurisdiction to regulate without some clear and
reliable expectation of what substantive rules other states will apply. Sec-
ond and following from the first, states recognize that the jurisdiction issue
simply recasts the question of preferences for substantive competition
rules.
This last point also suggests why a global bargain to allocate competi-
tion policy jurisdiction may be undesirable as well as unattainable. On
reflection, the jurisdictional question presents exactly the same issues and
problems as does substantive harmonization. There is no neutral template
for allocation that transcends the interests engaged by competition law,
and no reason to believe that those interests would not affect the structure
of any international bargain. In particular, giving an international agency
responsibility for supervising how states exercise their jurisdiction would
lead to exactly the same agency problems discussed in the previous
section.
D. The Future of International Supervision of Antitrust
The EU, the United States, and most scholars have treated interna-
tional antitrust as a problem that international institutions can solve. The
details of the solutions differ, but they have in common a conviction that
an international forum will serve as a means for transcending local inter-
we might because of the comparative advantage of compact groups, but that the legisla-
tion we do see still reflects private rather than public interests.
134. I previously have criticized commentators that invoke the concept of sovereignty
as a justification for particular positions on regulatory jurisdiction. Stephan, Choice of
Law, supra note 4, at 957-60. On close analysis, these invocations invariably turn out to
be stalking horses for other substantive claims that require distinct argumentation.
135. Dodge, supra note 133, at 28.
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ests of states in favor of global welfare. This faith in international coopera-
tion is misplaced. Analogies to trade agreements do not work, because the
interests at stake in competition policy are far less transparent and far
more likely to involve international wealth redistribution than those trig-
gered by direct trade barriers. This makes competition law far less suscep-
tible to oversight and satisfactory dispute settlement. We have every reason
to believe that international supervision either will be inconsequential,
along the lines of existing agreements on international antitrust, or
pernicious.
My critique suggests reconsidering what may happen if states do not
face international constraints on how they conduct their competition pol-
icy. Given certain plausible assumptions about the world economy, in par-
ticular those sectors that draw significantly on skill and innovation, an
anarchic international environment may contain substantial impediments
to a global race to the bottom in competition law. I explore this possibility
in the next section.
111. Anarchy, International Antitrust, Innovation, and Investment
In the first part of this paper, I described a static model that predicts
what competition law a state will enact and enforce. This model rests on
two assumptions: States seek to maximize a weighted sum of local con-
sumer and producer interests, and the choice of competition policy has no
secondary effects on consumer or producer welfare. The model regards
states as choosing among a fixed set of outcomes that proceed directly
from particular competition policies. Choices in one time period do not
affect the set of choices available in the next.
A dynamic model, by contrast, assumes that choices made in the first
time period alter the possibilities available in the next. I focus on a model
of innovation that emphasizes increasing marginal returns and explore the
relationship of this model to competition. One inference drawn from this
model is that inefficient competition policy can lead to long-term losses in
a globally competitive economy.
The question remains whether the static or the dynamic model offers
a better fit for particular sectors of the world economy. In industries such
as agriculture and natural resource extraction, the distribution of location-
specific natural endowments may dominate welfare calculations, and inno-
vation may play a less important role. In these sectors, we would expect to
find inefficient industrial structures that generate, or at least seek, monop-
oly rents, along with significant levels of trade protection. In knowledge-
based sectors, however, mobile factors of production-human and financial
capital-play a greater role. In these industries, a dynamic model provides
a better fit, because protection, either through government regulation or
private collusion, may affect access to human and financial capital.
Where the dynamic model applies, international intervention to regu-
late competition policy may be unnecessary. States that embrace ineffi-
cient competition policies to protect local producers or to benefit local
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consumers should experience lower rates of innovation and eventually lose
the ability to compete internationally. Even though not all economic sec-
tors or states will experience this effect, enough will to call into question
the need to institutionalize international competition policy.
A. Knowledge and Industrial Structure
A dynamic model of international competition policy depends criti-
cally on the propositions that innovative pressures in some important eco-
nomic sectors force producers to innovate or exit, that protection from
competitive pressure undermines the ability of producers to innovate, and
that producers in economic decline will eventually lose political influence
as well. I explore each of these propositions in turn.
First, consider the relationship between innovation and market suc-
cess. A substantial theoretical literature explores the impact of knowledge-
based investments on economic growth. In the standard model, knowledge
has low reproduction costs. Returns on knowledge thus depend critically
on the size of the market in which goods embodying knowledge can be
sold.136 Increases in the scope of the market, such as the creation of the
U.S. common market in the nineteenth century and of Europe's in the sec-
ond half of the twentieth, expand the opportunities for exploiting knowl-
edge and thus rewards investments in knowledge more greatly. Trade
liberalization and other strategies for broadening market size thus raise
incentives to invest in knowledge. 137
Recent research tends to support this hypothesis. Studies by Jeffrey
Frankel and coauthors have demonstrated a strong positive correlation
between trade openness and labor productivity, a good proxy for innova-
tion. 138 A more recent paper by Francisco AlcalA and Antonio Ciccone
refines these results by looking at the relationship between productivity
and openness in tradable goods, as opposed to gross measurements of an
economy's openness to trade. 13 9 Their analysis shows an even stronger
link between innovation and an economy's exposure to international com-
petition. Finally, a study of post-socialist transition economies by Wendy
Carlin, Mark Schaffer, and Paul Seabright shows a positive relationship
between innovation and the effectiveness of competition law. 1
40
136. See Paul M. Romer, Endogenous Technological Change, 98J. POL. EcON. S71, S72
(1990).
137. For empirical evidence, see Richard R. Nelson & Gavin Wright, The Rise and Fall
of American Technological Leadership: The Postwar Era in Historical Perspective, 30 J.
ECON. LIT. 1931 (1992).
138. See Jeffrey A. Frankel & David Romer, Does Trade Cause Growth?, 89 AMER. ECON.
REV. 379 (1999); Jeffrey Frankel & Andrew Rose, An Estimate of the Effect of Common
Currencies on Trade and Income, 117 Q. J. EcoN. 437 (2002).
139. FRANCISCO ALCALA & ANTONIO CICCONE, TRADE AND PRODUCTIVITY (Ctr. for Econ.
Policy Research, Discussion Paper No. 3095, 2001).
140. Wendy Carlin, et al., A Minimum of Rivalry: Evidence from the Transition Econo-
mies on the Importance of Competition for Innovation and Growth, in 3 CONTRIBUTIONS TO
ECON. ANALYSIS & POL'Y, ART. 17 (2004).
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It is important to clarify what this work does and does not indicate.
Under conventional models of development, a country's economic growth
depends both on its physical and human capital and on its efficiency in
using these assets. Other considerations, in particular institutional qual-
ity, have a strong relationship with levels of capital stocks, and the link
between economic openness and institutional quality is not well under-
stood. What the empirical work indicates, then, is not that openness is the
most influential factor in economic growth, but that it is an important fac-
tor in explaining how effectively an economy exploits the stock of physical
and human capital it has.
Other arguments support the proposition that barriers to competition
will impede investment as well as innovation. Monopoly rents derive from
restricting production below a level that efficient competition would dic-
tate. Lowering production implies, although it does not require, reducing
the level of investment in the industry. Barriers to entry, whether imposed
by private agreement or the state, implies fewer opportunities for the
deployment of capital. 14 1
To be sure, the link between investment and barriers to competition is
not as well documented as that between innovation and market size. How-
ever, the hypothesis that inefficient limits on competition serve as a barrier
to investment is plausible. Some data support an indirect inference. The
strong finding in the trade literature that declining industries, rather than
infant ones, have the greatest demand for protection suggests that indus-
tries that have lost their capacity to attract new investment tend to seek less
competitive market structures. 14 2
These claims explain why competition policy that does not pursue
efficiency will prove costly to states. First, states that permit local produc-
ers to construct inefficient constraints on competition are functionally
equivalent to states that undertake such protection directly. Tolerance of
inefficient collusion in an industry is likely to lead to lower rates of invest-
ment and innovation than otherwise would obtain. For industries that.
depend significantly on human and financial capital, these losses should
lead to low growth or shrinkage in the affected sector. Gradual immiseriza-
tion eventually should either impair an industry's ability to resist regula-
tion or lead to its economic irrelevance.
Second, states that use their competition law to impose inefficient
organizational structures on foreign producers with the object of protecting
local producers encourage lower rates of investment and innovation in the
protected sector. If bad competition law is the functional equivalent of
trade protectionism, then equivalent consequences should follow. The sec-
141. Early statement of the connection between monopolization and reduced oppor-
tunities for investment can be found inJOHN A. HoBSON, IMPERIALISM, A STUDY 74-76 (3d
ed. 1948).
142. For a review of the evidence on the demand for protection and a theoretical justi-
fication, see Oona A. Hathaway, Positive Feedback: The Impact of Trade Liberalization on
Industry Demands for Protection, 52 INT'L ORG. 575 (1998).
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tor should become increasingly uncompetitive internationally and eventu-
ally wither.
One can immediately anticipate a counterargument drawn from one
strand of strategic trade theory. Where oligopolists contend for an indus-
try characterized by positive returns to scale, state intervention may tip the
balance. This intervention might include punishing foreign producers with
competition law to facilitate the local producer's ascendancy as the effi-
cient global monopolist. 14 3 If states generally can choose when to invest in
industries that will become globally dominant, then they should include
competition law among the tools that they can use to implement such
decisions.
Considerable evidences suggests, however, that states rarely do a good
job of picking winners. A decade ago many U.S. scholars saw Japan as a
model of successful strategic trade policy. 1 4 4 Invoking this model, they
purported to identify U.S. industries where government-led success would
generate great local benefits at no significant global cost. 14 5 Revisionist
studies of Japanese policy reveal that the government generally supported
industries that did not have much success in international competition and
did little for those sectors-automobiles and consumer electronics-where
Japanese producers did enjoy some success.14 6 More generally, as noted
above, governments tend to weigh in on behalf of declining industries more
often than they bestow favors on rising sectors.
This argument for virtuous pressures to produce efficient competition
law is subject to two important qualifications. First, states that serve as a
base of operations for firms that largely export their products may seek to
free ride on the regulatory efforts of importing states. If no single import-
ing state were to consume a substantial share of the global output of such
producers, those states might not invest sufficient resources in imposing
competition rules. Under these circumstances, consumers over the short
run would suffer losses due to excess prices and low supply, while the
producing country might witness the eventual decline of the industry it
hosts. Here, collective action by the affected states to impose an appropri-
ate competition policy might produce a better outcome.
Second, the argument assumes that states eventually will respond to
the decline of local producers by withdrawing the protection that contrib-
utes to their decline. There is some point at which this assumption must
be correct. An industry that collapses completely must not have any ability
143. See generally George C. Lodge & William C. Crum, The Pursuit of Remedies, in
U.S. COMPETITIVENESS IN THE WORLD ECONOMY (Bruce R. Scott & George C. Lodge eds.,
1987) (referring to various protectionist legislation proposed in the United States);
James A. Brander & Barbara J. Spencer, Export Subsidies and International Market Share
Rivalry, 16 J. INT'L ECON. 83 (1985) (discussing the use of export subsidies to increase
market share of domestic producers). For claims that government selection of winning
technologies is feasible, see IRA C. MAGAZINER & ROBERT B. REICH, MINDING AMERICA'S
BuSINESS 197-202, 279-86 (1982).
144. VOGEL, supra note 42, at 225-32.
145. Id. at 232-45.
146. See sources cited supra note 42.
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to procure desired outcomes from government. However, it does not follow
that economic and political decline must be symmetrical. A sense of
beleaguerment might lead an industry to overcome internal divisions and
concentrate more directly on influencing governmental outcomes. The
U.S. steel industry provides a case in point. Although some firms have
increased their international competitiveness through increased investment
and higher labor productivity, others have used adversity as a ground for
procuring repeated episodes of protection from import competition and
have made no significant improvements in their production methods.
There is plenty of evidence that failing industries can obtain costly protec-
tion until collapse becomes imminent.14 7
These qualifications are important, but do not seriously undermine
the claim that virtuous forces make international cooperation less impera-
tive. First, the free-riding scenario seems somewhat hypothetical. States
generally have some incentive to protect their consumers from anticompeti-
tive practices, whether or not the local injury is a large portion of the global
injury. Most importantly, they do not have to limit their remedies to recov-
ery of the cost of local injury. Criminal sanctions, punitive damages, and
injunctions give local authorities the capacity to address a local harm pro-
portionately to its global ramifications.
Second, the disconnect between economic and political power is a gen-
eral problem and is not limited to local law production and enforcement.
Any state that will protect a failing industry by prosecuting its foreign
rivals will use its international relations to pursue similar goals. In particu-
lar, such a state will block any international accord that takes away its
discretion to impose such protection.
I do not mean to suggest that the appeal of a competition law that both
frustrates inefficient collusion and does not impede beneficial industrial
cooperation is always manifest, or that the consequences of bad competi-
tion law are immediately painful. Rather, I make two claims. First, in
industries that compete for capital internationally and that can realize sig-
nificant returns from increases in labor productivity, good competition law
matters. Second, the political mechanism that mediates between an indus-
try's economic status and a state's policy preferences should not change
when the state pursues those preferences through international coopera-
tion rather than by domestic lawmaking and enforcement. These claims,
in turn, suggest that, with respect to economic sectors dependent on
human and financial capital, states have some incentive to eschew competi-
tion policies that otherwise might generate short-term gains at the expense
of global welfare.
147. See William R. Cline, U.S. Trade and Industrial Policy: The Experience of Textiles,
Steel, and Automobiles, in STRATEGIC TRADE POLICY AND THE NEw INTERNATIONAL ECONOM-
ics, supra note 27, at 212-14.
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B. Regulatory Competition and International Antitrust Revisited
Models of regulatory competition, such as those developed in
Romano's work, invoke a stylized market in which states (putative sellers)
offer packages of law to firms (putative buyers) under conditions of con-
sumer choice. In these models, states gain some benefit by having firms
choose their law and thus wish to attract these buyers; firms choose laws
that maximize benefits to the firms' decisionmakers. As I argued above,
setting up such a market for competition law seems undesirable. We
would expect firms not to choose laws that maximize general welfare, but
rather to seek opportunities for monopoly rents. For this reason, we do not
find it disturbing that, in the contemporary world, firms have little influ-
ence over the choice of competition regulation that will apply to their activ-
ities. For the most part, firms can avoid a state's competition law only by
abandoning that jurisdiction entirely-neither producing, nor selling, nor
basing personnel, nor holding attachable assets in the territory of that
state.
The dynamic model of competition laws' effects on innovation and
investment, however, introduces an indirect form of regulatory competi-
tion. If states compete for capital and opportunities to generate returns
from knowledge, they should have some incentive to choose competition
law that increases their opportunities for both. Under this model, states
would not compete for producers as such, but rather for capital and inno-
vation. To the extent good competition law increases a state's attraction for
either, a virtuous cycle may proceed. Such a cycle would substitute for
international coordination of state choices.
This vision of virtuous competition for innovation and investment is
not as far-fetched as one might think. A conventional story about the rise
of Europe, endorsed by a Nobel prize winner and supported by a recent
review of the historical evidence, stresses the pressure placed on nearby
states by innovation in their neighbors. The evidence suggests that rent-
seeking becomes more expensive in the face of a neighbor's technological
progress, and that competition among neighbors offers a powerful explana-
tion for a state's willingness to sacrifice vested interests in the service of
adaptation. 148 Europe, a geographically fragmented entity, experienced
more of this competition; the geographically vast and hermetic empires of
China and Russia did not. And in today's world, with lower costs in trans-
portation and communication, geographical contiguity plays less of a role
148. See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, STRUCTURE AND CHANGE IN ECONOMIC HISTORY 143-86
(1981) (analyzing institutions, transaction costs, and instances of the free rider problem
to explain economic growth from early Europe to the nineteenth century); E.L. JONES,
THE EUROPEAN MIRACLE: ENVIRONMENTS, ECONOMIES, AND GEOPOLITICS IN THE HISTORY OF
EUROPE AND ASIA 45-148 (1987) (proposing a theory to explain why Europe developed
from the 1300s to the 1800s into a wealthy region while other regions did not); Azam
Chaudhry & Phillip Garner, Political Competition Between Countries and Economic
Growth (Aug. 29, 2002), available at www.bu.edu/econ/ied/neudc/papers/Chaudhry-
final.pdf. Similarly, the suppression of competition within a national economy can
impede innovation.
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in economic competition among states than in the past.149
This hypothesis requires important qualifications. First, it applies
largely to high value-added goods, including services, and not to industries
that depend mostly on factor endowments. Second, the mechanism driv-
ing the virtuous cycle is considerably less transparent than the seemingly
straightforward competition for corporate charters, a contest the existence
of which still remains subject to debate.' 5 0 The incentive for virtuous pol-
icy involves a long-term effect rather than short-term payoffs. One might
plausibly respond that political cycles do not run this long, and that no one
can realistically expect political actors to respond reliably to such forces.
These objections have great force. Their rebuttal depends largely on
guesses about the future rather than on evidence from the past. The funda-
mental issue is the nature and extent of the much hyped "new economy" at
the international level. For virtuous competition in competition policy to
have much purchase, two discernible trends in international economic
relations will have to become more pronounced. First, the portion of inter-
national transfers involving high value-added goods will have to grow even
more. Second, the pace of technological innovation and the response of
mobile capital to this pace will have to accelerate. These developments
would increase the importance of competition policy and shorten the time
between policy choice and economic consequences.
Looking only at the last five years, one might argue that the new econ-
omy never was much more than a pipe dream, and that any expectation of
its near-term recovery rests on irrational hope more than evidence. If one
were to expand the horizon to the past decade, however, the story becomes
more complicated and less fanciful. Japan, a country that exports capital
rather than investing it at home and that displays considerable structural
rigidity and resistance to domestic competition, has experienced zero or
negative growth during the period. The EU, whose competition policy has
more bite than Japan's but still seems to protect local producers more than
U.S. policy, has not enjoyed nearly the same growth in labor productivity
or inflows of capital that the United States has seen. Push back fifty years,
and the picture becomes even muddier, with postwar recovery driving
great early growth in Japan and Europe. One simply cannot make any
strong claim, positive or negative.
The possibility that there could be a race to the top in competition law
remains intriguing. If one takes my criticism of international cooperation
seriously, international anarchy starts to look good. The chance that
149. Less, of course, does not mean no role. The United States's largest trading part-
ner remains Canada, not Japan or any European country; and cross-border trade among
EU nations exceeds flows between those members and the rest of the world. See U.S.
Dep't of Commerce, TradeStats Express-National Trade Data, at http://tse.export.gov/
ITA2003_NATIONAL/TSEIntro.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2004); WORLD TRADE ORGANIZA-
TION, INTERNATIONAL TRADE STAISTIcs 2003, charts 111.3, 111.17 (showing intraregional
and interregional trade in merchandise and merchandise exports of NAFTA countries by
destination, 1990-2002), available at http://www.wto.org/english/res-e/statis-e/
its2003_e/its03_byregion-e.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2004).
150. See authorities cited supra note 124.
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trends now at work in the world economy may reduce the need for hard
law at the international level should temper our enthusiasm for lawmaking
projects that, at a minimum, divert resources, and possibly may exacerbate
the problems of international antitrust.
Conclusion
In the last decade or so, economists have developed the concept of
"government failure" to complement the traditional notion of "market fail-
ure."'15 1 The idea, roughly put, is that the structure of government can
cause suboptimal outcomes and avoidable deadweight losses.' 5 2 The
broader implication of the concept is that an analyst cannot make the case
for government action simply by identifying a market failure. The question
always remains whether a governmental response will make the problem
better or worse. The economist's cliche, "Compared to what?" applies here
too.
This paper argues that the problem of government failure exists at the
international level. To make the point, I have focused on a classic market
failure problem, namely private actions that frustrate competition. A con-
ventional analysis suggests that, in a world of international transactions,
states will fail to pursue competition policies that maximize global effi-
ciency. Most analysts have understood this argument to dispose of the
question of whether some kind of international governance is necessary to
respond to the problem, with disagreement limited to the best design of the
institutional response. I, in contrast, argue that a significant risk of govern-
ment failure attends any proposal for serious international governance in
this area, and that under certain assumptions the market failure may not
be as great as first believed.
Why has the policy consensus so largely settled on a different
approach? Perhaps I am simply a contrarian, and the case for some kind of
international governance is stronger than I acknowledge. One should con-
sider, however, reasons why the policy debate might be skewed in favor of
governance, even in the absence of a strong affirmative case.
A sociological observation might provide one answer. Legal elites ben-
efit from governmental action. They design the structure, staff it, and criti-
cize it. This general point takes on particular salience in the international
arena, where messy encumbrances on elite policy formation-elections,
competitors, and the like-do not exist. For someone committed to the
proposition that ideas and articulateness have a privileged role in policy
formation, international governance is an inviting playground.
The possibility that technological innovation and capital might pro-
vide a better check on anticompetitive behavior than do government agents
is especially disconcerting for members of this class. The people who
make these economic forces possible-compulsive tinkerers, lunatic risk-
151. See, e.g., Anne 0. Krueger, Government Failures in Development, J. EcON. PERSP.,
Summer 1990, at 9 (1990).
152. Id.
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takers-often have little affinity with the bright, well-spoken, and presenta-
ble folks who make legal institutions work. 153 Ceding power to people
who often cannot explain what they do is sufficiently unwelcome that fair-
minded lawyers will struggle with evidence suggesting that they should.
I do not claim that this sociological explanation suffices as a ground
for governmental inaction across the board. Rather, it suggests that the
proponents of new governmental structures, free of the constraints that
bind national states, bear a special burden of justification and need to
draw on extra reserves of skepticism. The current debate on international
antitrust wants these qualities.
153. See Robert Nozick, Why Do Intellectuals Oppose Capitalism?, CATO ONLINE POL'Y
REP., Jan. -Feb. 1998, at http://www.cato.org/pubs/policy-report/cpr20nl-l.html (last
visited Aug. 26, 2004).
